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DEPUTIZING THE FRONTLINE:
ENFORCING WORKPLACE RIGHTS IN A POSTPANDEMIC ECONOMY
Elizabeth J. Kennedyt
ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic exploded against a backdrop of federal
retrenchmentandrepeal of workplace rights andprotectionsforfrontline
workers, casting a spotlight on systemic racialinequity.1 While states and
cities emerged as the last line of defense for wage standardsin the United
States, the sweeping applicationof mandatoryarbitrationagreements and
restrictionson class actions makes enforcing those new rights difficult, if
not impossible.2 A forecasted post-pandemic recession will further
undermine the ability of workers to advocate for higher wages and
diminish the capacity of enforcement agencies to combat wage theft. 3
Given the enormity of this crisis, any effective response will require a
significant investment of public funds, either through massive federal
infrastructureand investment programs, or through a patchwork of state
Can the
and local initiatives that put individuals back to work.4
devastation of this moment lead us to a more equitablefuture? This paper
creates a pathforwardfor state and local governments to raise standards
t. Associate ProfessorofLaw andSocial Responsibility, Loyola University Maryland.
1. Valerie Wilson, Inequities Exposed: How COVID-19 Widened Racial Inequities in
Education, Health, and the Workforce, ECON. POL'Y INST. (June 22, 2020), https://www.epi.org
/publication/covid-19-inequities-wilson-testimony/.
2. See Epic Systems v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon,
Strengthening Labor StandardsEnforcement ThroughPartnershipswith Workers' Organizations, 38

POL. & SoC'Y, 552, 560 (2011).
3. See COVID-19 to Plunge Global Economy into Worst Recession Since World War II, THE
WORLD BANK (June 8, 2020), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/06/08/covidOLUGBENGA AJILORE ET
19-to-plunge-global-economy-into-worst-recession-since-world-war-ii;
AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A MORE PERFECT UNION: A POLICY BLUEPRINT FOR ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND INTERNATIONAL REBUILDING IN THE POST-COVID-19 ERA 1 (2021), https://

cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2021/01/12121 1 14/MorePerfectUnion-report.pdf?
_ga=2.2758576.1097303622.1614046034-319005387.1614046034.
4.

See AJILORE ET AL., supra note 3, at 7.
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by expanding the application of prevailing wage laws to economic
stimulus projects, and empowering frontline workers to enforce those
higher wages through qui tam actions that make them deputies in their
own fightfor equitable workplace standards.
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INTRODUCTION

Wando Evans's job may have been classified as essential, but the
lack of protection afforded to him by regulators and corporate leaders
reflects a life considered to be expendable. 5 As one of millions of
disproportionately black and brown grocery and retail workers, Mr. Evans
worked for low wages with scant protective gear, which allowed the rest
of the nation to shelter in place during a global pandemic. 6 Two days after

5. See Abha Bhattarai, It Feels Like a War Zone: As More of Them Die, Grocery Workers
IncreasinglyFearShowing Up, THE WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/business/2020/04/12/grocery-worker-fear-death-coronavirus/; Hye Jin Rho et al., CEPR, A BASIC
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF WORKERS IN FRONTLINE INDUSTRIES (Apr. 2020), https://cepr.net/wp-

content/uploads/2020/04/2020-04-Frontline-Workers.pdf

(there

is no

uniform definition

of

"essential" worker, but a recent study found that workers in six different sectors were likely to be
included in most federal, state and local essential worker definitions, including those in health care,
trucking, warehouse, and postal services; grocery stores, convenience stores, and drugstores; public
transportation; building-cleaning services; and child-care and social services); CHRISTOPHER C.
KREBS, CISA, ADVISORY MEMORANDUM ON IDENTIFICATION OF ESSENTIAL CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE WORKERS DURING COVID-19 RESPONSE (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.cisa.gov
Infrastructure
/sites/default/files/publications/Version_3.0_CISA_Guidance_on_EssentialCritical
_Workers_1 .pdf (the U.S. Department of Homeland Security considers essential workers as those,
"who conduct a range of operations and services that are typically essential to continued critical
infrastructure viability . .. The industries they support represent, but are not limited to, medical and
healthcare, telecommunications, information technology systems, defense, food and agriculture,
transportation and logistics, energy, water and wastewater, law enforcement, and public works");
Francine D. Blau et al., Essential andFrontline Workers in the COVID-19 Crisis, ECONOFACT (Apr.
("Frontline
30, 2020), https://econofact.org/essential-and-frontline-workers-in-the-covid-19-crisis
workers," are a narrower subset of essential workers who typically cannot work remotely, receive
lower wages on average and are disproportionately workers of color. These include, but are not limited

to, "healthcare workers, protective service workers (police and EMTs), cashiers in grocery and
general merchandise stores, production and food processing workers, janitors and maintenance
workers, agricultural workers, and truck drivers. These workers constitute 60% of essential workers
and 42% of all workers ... Healthcare workers represent 20% of all frontline workers"). For purposes
of this article, however, "frontline workers" excludes the relatively high-paying, highly educated
group of doctors, registered nurses and pharmacists (about three-quarters of all healthcare workers),

but does include health-support workers (e.g., nursing assistance and home health aides), which
comprise roughly one-quarter of all essential healthcare workers.
6. See Bhattarai, supra note 5 (stating the hourly wages for grocery employees like Mr. Evans

averaged $11.43 in 2018 and showing that while doctors, nurses, EMTs and other medical workers
have the highest risk of exposure to the coronavirus, frontline workers in grocery stores also come
into contact with large numbers of people, often without protective gear, and without the abilityfinancially or by right-to stay at home and forego wages to care for their own health or the health of
their families). See also Jamila Henderson et al., A ProfileofFrontline Workers in the Bay Area, BAY
AREA EQUITY ATLAS (May 13, 2020), https://bayareaequityatlas.org/essential-workers ("Black
workers, who account for just 5 percent of all workers in the region, are also concentrated in specific
frontline industries public transit (23 percent); trucking, warehouse, and postal services (11 percent);
childcare and social services (10 percent); and health care (8 percent)"). See generally ALEXANDER
HERTEL-FERNANDEZ ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE COvID-19 WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE FROM A
SURVEY OF ESSENTIAL WORKERS, ROOSEVELT INST. 1, 3 (June 2020), https://rooseveltinstitute.org

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

3

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 2
206

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:2

being sent home with flu-like symptoms from Walmart, where he had
7
worked for fifteen years, Mr. Evans was found dead in his apartment.
Dangerous working conditions, and a lack of affordable health care and
paid sick leave are hazards faced by low-wage workers during normal
times. 8 But these are not normal times. At least eighty-two grocery
workers have died from COVID-19, with thousands more sickened and in
recovery. 9
Treating the lives of frontline workers like Wando Evans as
disposable is not a recent trend. 10 The COVID-19 pandemic exploded
against a backdrop of federal retrenchment and aggressive deregulation,
against which states and cities had begun to emerge as the last line of
defense in preserving and raising standards, especially for lower-wage
workers."1 Although the federal minimum wage has remained stagnant at
$7.25 for over a decade,12 cities like Seattle, San Francisco, and New

/publications/understanding-the-covid- l 9-workplace-evidence-from-a-survey-of-essential-workers/
(showing recent research that Black essential workers are nearly twice as likely as white essential
workers to be concerned about the risk of infection).
7. Bhattarai, supra note 5.
8. See ESSENTIAL AND VULNERABLE: SERVICE-SECTOR WORKERS AND PAID SICK LEAVE,
THE SHIFT PROJECT 1 (Apr. 2020), https://shift.berkeley.edu/files/2020/04/Essential_and_Vulnerable

_ServiceSector_WorkersandPaid_SickLeave.pdf ("We find that 55% of workers at large
service-sector firms have no paid sick leave, and women are significantly less likely to have paid sick
leave than their male co-workers. Workers who lack sick leave are very financially insecure-a quarter

struggle to pay their bills and a third experienced hunger hardship even before the COVID-19
outbreak.").
"[I] couldn't even walk or breathe and I'm like, I think I may have to go to the hospital,

because I'm not feeling well and my schedule, I think it was 3-12 that day or 2-11,
something like that. So I called my boss in the morning, that was at around 9 or 10 o'clock.

And I told 'em, you know I don't feel good, I need to have the day off today, because I
feel real sick... He was like, 'No, I cannot give you the day off. If you don't come in, I
will give you 3 days of suspension' ... and I went to work like that."
Id. at 2.
9. Russell Redman, UFCW: Over 11,500 Grocery Workers Affected in First 100 Days of
Pandemic, SUPERMARKET NEWS (June 26, 2020), https://www.supermarketnews.com/issues-trends

/ufcw-over-11500-grocery-workers-affected-first-100-days-pandemic.
10. See David Madland et al., How the Federal Government Can Protect Essential Workers in
the Fight Against Coronavirus, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 8, 2020), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2020/04/08/48288 1/federal-government-canprotect-essential-workers-fight-coronavirus/.

11. See Terri Gerstein & David Seligman, How States Can Enforce Workers' Rights When
Trump and His Supremes Don't Want To, THE AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 14, 2018), https://prospect.org
/article/how-states-can-enforce-workers%E2%80%99-rights-when-trump-and-his-supremes-

don%E2%80%99t-want.
12. Jack Arnholz, Minimum Wage to Increase in More than 20 States in 2020, ABC NEWS
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/minimum-wage-increase-20-states-2020
2019),
(Dec.
31,
/story?id=67935502. See also After the Longest Period in History Without an Increase, the Federal
Minimum Wage Today is Worth 17% Less Than 10 Years ago - and 31% Less than in 1968, ECON.
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York,1 3 together with nineteen states, have raised the floor to $10, $12 and
even $15 an hour.14 Although twenty-one states have minimum wages
equal to or less than the federal standard, roughly one-fifth of workers live
in states where the minimum wage is set to rise to at least $15 an hour."
Where legislatures have failed to raise minimum workplace standards,
voters have passed ballot initiatives to do so. 16 Likewise, nine states,
including New York, California, Illinois, and Hawaii have extended
overtime coverage to historically excluded workers in the home care and
domestic work industries.17 Cities such as New York have passed more
expansive laws prohibiting discrimination and harassment, 18 as well as
laws requiring employers to provide paid sick and family leave. 19 To

POL'Y

INST.,

https://www.epi.org/multimedia/after-the-longest-period-in-history-without-an-

increase-the-federal-minimum-wage-today-is-worth- 17-less-than-10-years-ago-and-3 1-less-than-in1968/ (last visited May 26, 2010).
13. Amholz, supranote 12 (stating that in 2020 alone, the minimum wage will increase in 26
U.S. cities and counties, affecting more than half of the country's population including Seattle,
Petaluma and New York, each of which is agreeing to raise their municipal minimum wage to $15 an
hour (with, in the case of Seattle and Petaluma, lower minimum standards for small businesses)). See

also Seattle City Takes Lead to Raise Minimum Wage to $15 per Hour, SEATTLE NEWS (June 4, 2014),
https://www.seattlenews.net/news/222576235/seattle-city-takes-lead-to-raise-minimum-wage-to-15per-hour; Kirk Johnson, Voters in SeaTac, Wash., Back $15 Minimum Wage, THE N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/us/voters-in-seatac-wash-back-15-minimum26,
wage.html.
14. See State Minimum Wages, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS (Jan. 28, 2021), https://
("Twentywww.ncsl.org/researchlabor-and-employment/state-minimum-wage-chart.aspx#Table.

one states began 2020 with higher minimum wages. Seven states (Alaska, Florida, Minnesota,
Montana, Ohio, South Dakota, and vermont) automatically increased their rates based on the cost of

living, while 14 states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Washington) increased their rates due
to previously approved legislation or ballot initiatives.")
15. See id.
16. Id.
17.

See Elizabeth J. Kennedy & Michael B. Runnels, Bringing New Governance Home: The

Needfor Regulation in the Domestic Workplace, 81 UMKC L. REV. 899, 918 (2013) (showing that
New York passed the Domestic Workers Bill of Rights that mandated a higher rate of overtime pay
for live-in domestic workers).

See also Paul Shukovsky, Seattle City Council Passes Domestic

Workers Bill of Rights, BLOOMBERG LAW (July 24, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/dailylabor-report/seattle-city-council-passes-domestic-workers-bill-of-rights

(showing

that

Seattle

became the first U.S. city to pass a Domestic Workers Bill of Rights in July 2019, which created a
minimum wage, rest break, and meal break rights to domestic workers, along with a Domestic
Workers Standards Board).
18. Brie Kluytenaar, New York Says #MeToo to Stronger Sexual Harassment Laws, MINTZ
(Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2226/2018-04-new-york-saysmetoo-stronger-sexual-harassment-protections.
19. Interactive Overview of Paid Sick Time Laws in the United States, A BETTER BALANCE,
https://www.abetterbalance.org/paid-sick-time-laws/ (last visited May 26, 2020).
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ensure effective application of these new laws, cities like Chicago, 20
Denver,21 Flagstaff,22 Los Angeles, 2 3 Seattle,2 4 and San Francisco 2 5 have
either created or designated municipal agencies to enforce them.
For every step forward in the creation of stronger state and local
workplace protections for frontline workers, however, another barrier was
erected to prevent workers from enforcing those rights. 26 Mandatory
arbitration agreements have become the new norm in the American
workplace, and the Supreme Court and various district courts have been
willing to uphold their use to block low-wage workers from accessing the
courts to enforce legal protections. 27 The recent federal revocation of joint
employer liability 28 in the construction, agriculture, garment, janitorial,
home care and logistics industries has meant even further marginalization
of those workers. 29 Looking ahead, as the economic tsunami of COVID19 bears down on precarious employers, we can expect many to cut costs

20.

Office of Labor Standards, CHICAGO, https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/bacp/supp

_info/officeoflaborstandards.html (last visited May 26, 2020).
21. Denver Labor, CITY AND CTY. OF DENVER, https://www.denverauditor.org/denverlabor/

(last visited May 26, 2020).
22.

Office

of Labor Standards, Filing a Complaint,

CITY OF FLAGSTAFF,

https://

www.flagstaff.az.gov/3753/Filing-a-Complaint (last visited May 26, 2020).
23. Wage Standards, CITY OF LOS ANGELES DEP'T OF PUBLIC WORKS BUREAU CONT. ADMIN.,
https://bca.lacity.org/wage-standards (last visited May 26, 2020).
24.

Office of Labor Standards, SEATTLE.GOv, https://www.seattle.gov/laborstandards

(last

visited May 26, 2020).
25.

Office of Labor Standards Enforcement, CITY AND CTY OF S.F., https://sfgov.org/olse/ (last

visited May 26, 2020).
26. See Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1612 (2018) (establishing a legal
precedent whereby employers may require employees to sign arbitration agreements, in turn blocking
employees from pursuing claims of wage theft).

27. Id. at 1619 (upholding the validity of employment contracts in which employees give up
their right to collective litigation against their employer).

See, e.g., Turner v. Chipotle, 123 F. Supp.

3d 1300 (D. Colo. 2015) (establishing a barrierfor employees to claim wage theft); Williams v. FCA
US LLC, No. 17-10097, 2018 WL 2364068, at *1, *10 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2018) (compelling
arbitration even in a case regarding discrimination); Wiatrek v. Flowers Food, Inc., No. SA-17-CA772-XR, 2018 WL 3040583, at *1, *8 (W.D. Tex. June 16, 2018) (allowing defendant to compel
arbitration in a case regarding misclassification).
28. Joint Employment Explained: How H.R. 3441 Legalizes a Corporate Rip-off of Workers,
NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nelp.org/publication/joint-employmentexplained-how-hr-3441-legalizes-corporate-rip-off-workers/.
29. See Noam Scheiber, US Moves to Limit Wage Claims Against Chains Like McDonald's,

N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/business/economy/labordepartment-joint-employer.html. See also, News Release, U.S. Department of Labor Issues Proposal
for Joint Employer Regulation,

(Apr.

1, 2019)

https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd

/whd20190401.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol38/iss2/2
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by illegally underpaying their employees, a crime referred to as "wage
theft." 30
Combating the coronavirus requires strong collaboration among
doctors, scientists, public health officials, elected leaders, and citizens. 31
So, too, does combating wage theft. A model of top-down workplace
enforcement is ineffective when the "top"-in this case, the federal
administration-is actively hostile to the goal of expanding workplace
protections.32 While families of occupational COVID-19 victims like
Wando Evans' are filing lawsuits to hold employers accountable, frontline
workers need creative means of enforcing workplace rights while they are
still on the job, not only for their own safety and economic security, but
for the health and welfare of the nation.3 3
COVID-19 has cast a spotlight on systemic racial inequity across
systems of education, policing, housing, and employment. 34 Can the
devastationof this moment lead us to a more equitablefuture? This article
creates a path forward for state and local governments to raise the floor
30. A Practical Guide to Combatting Wage Theft, CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY
2017)

1

(Nov.

https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/WTHandbook-web

_output%20%281 %29.pdf.
Practices considered to be "wage theft" include:
"
Paying less than the minimum wage
"
Failing to pay required overtime

"

Paying less than the promised wage

"

Misclassifying an employee as an independent contractor to avoid paying
workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, or an hourly wage

"
"
"

Deducting the cost of required uniforms or tools from paychecks
Failing to provide paid sick leave where required by law
Compelling uncompensated work "off the clock"

Id.
31. See Madland et al., supra note 10 (stating that essential workers, health care workers, and
Congress must work together to overcome challenges posed by COVID-19).
32. See Saharra Griffin & Malkie Wall, PresidentTrump's Anti-Worker Agenda, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS ACTION FUND (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/economy
/reports/2019/08/28/174893/president-trumps-anti-worker-agenda/
(stating
that
the
Trump
administration has continuously sided with corporate entities while American workers suffer).

33.

See Complaint at 3-4, 6, Evans v. Walmart, Inc., No. 2020L003938 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Apr.

6, 2020). The estate alleges that Walmart owed all of its employees a duty of reasonable care, "in
keeping the store in a safe and healthy environment" and that Walmart should have taken all of the
preventive measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, including more frequent store cleanings and
sterilizations, strict social distancing guidelines, and the provision of personal protective equipment
such as masks, gloves, and hand sanitizer. Id. at 3-5. According to the plaintiff, "[a]s a direct and
proximate cause of [Walmart's alleged failure to take those steps], the Decedent was infected by

COvID-19 and ultimately died .... " Id. at 6.
34. See e.g., Francine D. Blau et al., Essentialand Frontline Workers in the COVID-19 Crisis,
ECONOFACT (Apr. 30, 2020), https://econofact.org/essential-and-frontline-workers-in-the-covid-19crisis.
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on wages by expanding the application of federal, state, and local
prevailing wage laws to jobs and industries in which public funds are
35
either used or a public benefit is accrued, and strengthen the ability of
36
frontline workers to enforce those standards through qui tam actions.
While this author has previously proposed the use of qui tam lawsuits to
enforce wage standards in the home healthcare industry" this paper
argues that an expansion of qui tam to other frontline industries may hold
the key to "resisting" the current federal agenda of repeal, retrenchment,
and repression. Part I of this article describes the problems of wage theft and
substandard wages for frontline workers, as well as barriers to enforcing
38
existing state and federal wage standards. Part II explains and evaluates two
federal laws - the Davis-Bacon Act and the Service Contract Act- as well as
their state and local law counterparts and proposes an expansion of those
39
statutes to cover a greater number of workers. Part III considers the use of
qui tam lawsuits - a very old remedy with very modern implications - as a
40
creative solution to the lack of effective workplace standards enforcement.
This proposal builds upon the growing sense that private conduct has
41
public consequences, such as in the context of a health care mandate or
42
The article concludes that an
the disparate impacts of climate change.
expansion of prevailing wages coupled with qui tam enforcement could help
individual workers, worker centers, and labor unions raise the floor on wages
while strengthening the enforcement of wage standards from the bottom up.

35. See e.g., Karla Walter, Getting Americans Back to Work and Good Jobs, CTR. FOR AM.
29
2020
/06/
PROGRESS (June 29, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/

/487075/getting-americans-back-work-good-jobs/ (stating that federally supported companies must
create jobs that ensure workers an increased minimum wage, expansion of benefits, and paid family
and medical leave).
36. See e.g., David Groves, Empowering Workers to Blow the Whistle, THE STAND (Feb. 13,
(stating that
2020), https://www.thestand.org/2020/02/empowering-workers-to-blow-the-whistle/
states like Washington have attempted to enact legislation which would provide workers with an
increased ability to report workplace violations).

37. See Elizabeth J. Kennedy, Wage Theft as Public Larceny, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 517, 542-43,
561 (2016).
38.
39.
40.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.

41. See, e.g., Christine Eibner & Sarah A. Nowak, The Effect of Eliminating the Individual
FUND (July 11, 2018),
Mandate Penalty and the Role of Behavioral Factors, COMMONWEALTH
2

https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/ 018/jul/eliminating-individualmandate-penalty-behavioral-factors.
42. See, e.g., Tina Schneider, Responsibilityfor Private Sector Adaptation to Climate Change,

19 ECOLOGY & SOC'Y 1, 7 (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-06282-190208.
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"LIKE A WAR ZONE"

Wage Suppression in FrontlineIndustries

Wage theft is a term used to describe a broad spectrum of employer
violations of federal and state laws 43 that result in workers not being paid their
legally mandated wages for hours worked." Employers may refuse to pay
their workers at all, pay for some hours but not others, or pay only straight
wages for hours worked in excess of forty hours a week.45 Other workers
become victims of wage theft when their employers require them to work
"off-the-clock"46 or intentionally misclassify them as "independent
contractors" to evade payroll taxes 4 7 Workers misclassified as independent
contractors lose not only the protection of minimum wage and overtime laws,
but also access to critical "safety-net benefits like unemployment insurance,
workers' compensation, and Social Security and Medicare."4" For frontline
workers in a pandemic, wage theft is one of the many occupational hazards
in a workplace that has been described, by at least one employee, as "like a
war zone."" 9

43. See supra source and text accompanying note 30.
44. See KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS ARE
NOT GETTING PAID-AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 7, 8 (2009). See also Press Release, State

of California Dep't of Just., Off. of the Att'y Gen., Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces
Settlement with Car Washes that Underpaid Workers and Violated Labor Laws (Jan. 10, 2012),
https://www.oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-announces-

settlement-car-washes-underpaid. See Press Release, New York State Off. of Att'y Gen. Eric T.
Schneiderman, A.G. Schneiderman Announces NYC Restaurant andNightclub Will Pay $200,000for

Retaliation Against Employees and Illegal Labor Practices(Mar. 1, 2012), https://ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/2012/ag-scheiderman-announces-nyc-restaurant-and-nightclub-will-pay-200000
(showing
that employers are prohibited from taking a cut of restaurant workers' tips).
45. Brady Meixell & Ross Eisenbrey, An Epidemic of Wage Theft is Costing Workers Hundreds

of Millions of Dollars a Year, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.epi.org/publication
/epidemic-wage-theft-costing-workers-hundreds/

("When a worker earns only a minimum wage

($290 for a 40-hour week), shaving a mere half hour a day from the paycheck means a loss of more
than $1,400 a year, including overtime premiums. That could be nearly 10 percent of a minimumwage employee's annual earnings - the difference between paying the rent and utilities or risking

eviction and the loss of gas, water, or electric service.").
46.

See Annette Bernhardt et al., Employers Gone Rogue: Explaining Industry Variation in

Violations of Workplace Laws, 66 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 808, 809 (2013).
47. PayrollFraud: TargetingBadActors Hurting Workers andBusinesses, Hearingon S. 113818 Before the Subcomm. on Emp. and Workplace Safety, 113th Cong. 1, 15 (2013) (statement of

Catherine K. Ruckelshaus) ("Companies [misclassify employees] to avoid having to report and pay
FICA and FUTA taxes, evade labor organizing, skirt baseline labor standards like minimum wage
and overtime, discrimination protections, health and safety and workers compensation, and
unemployment insurance.").
48. Kennedy, supranote 37, at 530.
49. Bhattarai, supra note 5.
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Wage theft is pervasive, cutting across industry lines and geographic
50
boundaries, but is particularly pernicious in frontline industries. A study of
workers in low-wage industries across three U.S. cities found that in any
given week, two-thirds had been the victim of at least one incidence of wage
theft.51 The researchers estimated that the average loss per worker over the
course of a year was $2,634 out of total earnings of $17,616, with a collective
52
loss for workers in those three cities alone of $3 billion. According to a
May 2017 study by the Economic Policy Institute, a non-profit, nonpartisan
think tank, 2.4 million workers in the ten largest states lose $8 billion annually
to minimum wage violations alone. 53 Generalizing to the rest of the U.S. lowwage workforce, wage theft costs workers $15 billion per year, not including
overtime violations, a devastating loss for those workers who can least afford
it.54 The epidemic of wage theft has hit low-wage and immigrant workers the
hardest, groups that are disproportionally workers of color, who are also
55
disproportionately impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. According to a
recent profile of Bay Area frontline workers, nearly 17 percent earn wages
that place them and their families below 200 percent of the poverty level,
56
which is approximately $48,000 for a family of four.
When wage theft goes unchecked and unregulated, ethical employers
who comply with or even exceed minimal labor standards (so-called "high57
road employers") operate at a competitive disadvantage. The incentives for
employers to violate the law-reducing payroll costs and underbidding
competitors- are obvious. Rampant wage theft in certain industries harms

50.

See Nantiya Ruan, What's Left to Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates that Bar

Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1108-10 (2012).
51. Meixell & Eisenbrey, supra note 45.
52. Id.
53. See David Cooper & Teresa Kroeger, Employers Steal Billionsfrom Workers' Paychecks
Each Year, ECON. POL'Y. INST. (May 10, 2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/employers-stealbillions-from-workers-paychecks-each-year/ (finding that for the ten most populous states, "2.4
million workers lose $8 billion annually (an average of $3,300 per year for year-round workers) to
minimum wage violations-nearly a quarter of their earned wages").

&

54. Id. ("[A]ccording to the FBI, the total value of all robberies, burglaries, larceny, and
motor vehicle theft in the United States in 2015 was $12.7 billion."). See also Meixell
Eisenbrey, supra note 45 ("[I]n the United States in 2012, there were 292,074 robberies of all
kinds .. .The total value of the property taken in those crimes was $340,850,358.").
55. Cooper & Kroeger, supra note 53.
56. Jamila Henderson et al., A Profile ofFrontlineWorkers in the Bay Area, BAY AREA EQUITY
ATLAS (May 13, 2020), https://bayareaequityatlas.org/essential-workers.
57. See Coming Up Short: The State of Wage Theft Enforcement in New York, MAKE THE ROAD
N.Y. & THE CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY 8 (Apr. 2019), https://maketheroadny.org/wp-content

/uploads/2019/04/Coming-Up-Short-The-State-of-Wage-Theft-Enforcement-in-NY-4_8_19.pdf
("When labor law violations go unenforced, unscrupulous businesses have an incentive to adopt wage
theft as a business model.").

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol38/iss2/2

10

Kennedy: Deputizing the Frontline: Enforcing Workplace Rights in a Post-Pa
DEPUTIZINGTHE FRONTLINE

2021]

213

not only the worker; indeed, such a pattern and practice of wage theft also
"hurts law-abiding businesses and encourages unfair competition."58
Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, wage theft, "illegally siphon[s] off
state, local, and federal tax dollars, costing local governments millions of
dollars in lost revenues for local governments." 5 9
In a double blow to state and local economies, since low-income
workers are likely to circulate their earnings in the local economy by
spending on basic necessities like food, clothing, and housing, any theft
of those earnings by employers affects not only the [frontline] worker,
but also the other businesses that workers would have patronized in the
absence of wage theft.6 0

Wage theft also strains an already stretched public safety net, as workers
whose wages are stolen by their employers are forced to rely on "food stamps,
food banks, temporary assistance with utility bill payments, subsidized
housing, and shelters" to meet their families' most basic needs. 6 1
B. Barriersto Enforcing Wage Standards
Workplace law currently provides three pathways for victims of wage
theft: file a complaint with the relevant state or federal labor agency, file a
private lawsuit alleging violations of the FLSA or state and local wage and
58.

Kennedy, supranote 37, at 531.

59. Id. See Sarah Leberstein, Independent Contractor Misclassification Imposes Huge Costs
on Workers and Federal and State Treasuries, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT 1 (Aug. 2012), http://

nelp.3cdn.net/0693974b8e20a9213eg8m6bhyfx.pdf

("Employers increasingly misclassify their

employees as independent contractors, denying them the protection of workplace laws, ... reducing
federal, state and local withholding and revenues."); see also The Social and Economic Effects of
Wage Violations: Estimates for California and New York, E. RSCH. GRP., INC. ES-4 (Dec. 2014),
(The
http://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/completed-studies/WageViolationsReportDecember2014.pdf
report estimates "that minimum wage violations in California reduced payroll taxes by $167 million
in 2010. ... In New York, the estimated reduction in payroll tax was $71.0 million in
2010. . . . Minimum wage violations resulted in an estimated $113 million in lost federal income taxes
in 2010 (between the two states). The California state government lost $14 million and the New York
state government lost $8 million in income tax revenues in tax year 2010 due to minimum wage
violations. Finally, minimum wage violations led to workers who had violations losing $4.5 million

in EITC benefits in California and $1.1 million in EITC benefits in New York in 2010.").
60. Kennedy, supra note 37, at 531-32; HOUSTON INTERFAITH WORKER JUST. CTR., HOUSTON,
WE HAVE A WAGE THEFT PROBLEM 4 (2012), https://stopwagetheft.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/2012houston-wage-theft-report.pdf.
61. Kennedy, supra note 37, at 532; Pamela Loprest & Demetra Nightingale, The Nature of
Work and the Social Safety Net, URB. INST. (July 2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files

/publication/98812/thenatureofwork_adn_the_social_safetynet.pdf (listing the largest and most
commonly referred to public safety net programs, all of which except the unemployment insurance
program are available based on a person's income).
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hour standards, or do both. 62 Ensuring that employers comply with wage
standards requires a robust investigation and enforcement arm of
government, as well as the unfettered ability of workers to bring private
lawsuits. 63 Most state and local governments lack sufficient resources to
investigate and enforce workplace standards, 64 which shifts the burden of
enforcement to workers and the courts. 65 Yet that shift is quite literally a
burden for low-wage, marginalized workers, for whom bringing a private
lawsuit can be personally, economically, and emotionally costly. 66
Although wage theft is estimated to cost U.S. workers up to $50 billion
per year 67 (and to have collateral economic impacts on already strained local
and state economies in a post-pandemic recovery), 68 "the penalties under
federal law for even willful and repeat violations are minimal." 69 The
maximum civil penalty for directly stealing from employees (such as by
repeatedly or willfully failing to pay minimum wages) is only $1,100.70

62.

Kennedy, supra note 37, at 532. See Back Pay, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/dol

/topic/wages/backpay.htm (last visited Apr. 20,2021); How to File a Complaint,U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., https://
www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/contact

/complaints#:-:text=If%20you%20have%20questions%20or,trained%20professionals%20to%20help%20
you. (last visited Apr. 20, 2021).
63. See Kennedy, supra note 37, at 531 ("In a recent study of the efficacy of workplace standards
enforcement regimes, Professors Alexander and Prasad found that 'the least politically, economically, and
socially powerful and secure workers were the least likely to make claims, the most likely to experience
retaliation, and the least likely to have accurate substantive and procedural legal knowledge."') (citing
Charlotte Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An Empirical
Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1098-99 (2014)).
64. HOUSTON, WE HAVE A WAGE THEFT PROBLEM, supra note 60, at 1.

65. Id. at 6-7.
66. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 63, at 1073 ("Workers are overdeterred from claiming, and
employers may be underdeterred from complying, creating a self-perpetuating enforcement gap in labor and
employment law."). See Andrew Elmore, Collaborative Enforcement, 10 N.E. U. L.J. 72, 92 (2018)
("Although unauthorized workers are employees under the NLRA, they cannot receive reinstatement or

post-termination backpay as a remedy for a NLRA violation ... [T]he most likely remedy for an NLRA
violation is a nearly costless cease and desist order and posting.").
67. Meixell & Eisenbrey, supranote 45.
68.

Oscar Padilla et al., The COVID-19 Outbreak Weakens U.S. State and Local Government

Credit Conditions, S&P GLOB. RATINGS (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en
/research/articles/200402-the-covid-19-outbreak-weakens-u-s-state-and-

local-government-credit-

conditions-11411641 ("A distinguishing characteristic of the COVID-19- induced recession is that
efforts to contain its spread have resulted in a sharp decline in economic activity.").
69. Meixell & Eisenbrey, supra note 45. See Coming Up Short: The State of Wage Theft
Enforcement in New York, supra note 57, at 11 ("[F]ederal labor law only covers employees who
work for enterprises with sales of at least $500,000 a year.").

70. Meixell & Eisenbrey, supranote 45; 29 U.S.C. § 216 (e)(2) (2012). The FLSA provides for
liquidated damages equal to two times the amount of wages illegally withheld. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Under some parallel state wage and hour laws, a liquidated damages amount equal to treble the
amount of illegally withheld wages may be available. See id. (authorizing private actions and
specifying the recovery available). See also Andrew Elmore, supra note 66, at 82-83 ("Private, for-
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Paltry remedies coupled with the high costs of pursuing an external,
formal claim, means that pursuing a legal claim just doesn't make much
economic sense for many workers. 71 Moreover, when workers pursue
individual claims, the risk of retaliation by employers increases. 72 Retaliation
can take many forms, including termination, salary reduction, harassment,
and adverse changes to schedules or assignments. 3 Pursuing a class action
would minimize some of those risks, however the Supreme Court's 2017
decision in Epic Systems greatly restricted to the ability of workers to hold
their employers accountable through class action lawsuits. 74 In the wake
of that decision, there have been additional factors which have heightened
the need for creative enforcement mechanisms. These factors include the
widespread use of mandatory arbitration agreements that prevent workers

profit attorneys have little incentive to represent plaintiffs where labor standards are the worst because
these employers are often small and judgment proof. Public agencies tasked with enforcing labor
standards lack the resources to inspect all workplaces effectively, the expertise to detect labor and safety

and health violations, and the enforcement tools to remedy them. Public enforcers have adopted different
strategic enforcement approaches to prioritize the worst violations and the least compliant industries.
Yet, and particularly with the retreat of federal agency labor standards enforcement, state and local

agencies face strong headwinds in changing employer norms and ensuring compliance with new
statutory protections.").
71. Pursuing a claim often doesn't make financial sense for an attorney, given the relatively
small amount of money at stake in an individual claim. Moreover, even when workers are successful
in pursuing a claim, many never see a dime of their recovery. See, e.g., URB. JUST. CTR., LEGAL AID
SOC'Y & NAT'L CTR FOR L. & ECON. JUST., EMPTY JUDGMENTS: THE WAGE COLLECTION CRISIS IN

NEW YORK 4, 5 (2015) https://nclej.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Empty-Judgments-The-WageCollection- Crisis-in-New-York.pdf. "In the months or years it takes to get a court judgment,
employers transfer money from their bank accounts, put property in the names of family members,
close down their business or change its name, create sham corporation, ignore court orders, or leave
the country with their property... As a result, many workers never get paid the wages they earned,

even when they engage in a lengthy legal process." Id. at 4. "At least 10 states, including Maryland
and Wisconsin, permit workers to put a lien on an employer's property in connection with a wage
claim." Chris Fuchs, Wage Theft Cases can be Easy to Win. Collecting is a Different Story., NBC
NEWS (June 19, 2019, 1:15 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/wage-theft-cases-

can-be-easy-win-collecting-different-story-n1018306.
72.

Alexander & Prasad, supra note 63, at 1104, 1106. In a recent study of low-wage workers

who pursued a claim against an employer for wage theft, about 43% experienced some form of retaliation.
Id at 1104. Such retaliation is itself often without a helpful legal solution, given that the only remedy offered
by traditional employment and labor law is an opportunity to pursue in court a claim for the retaliation-the
very action that placed the worker in jeopardy in the first place. Id This is particularly evident when it comes
to class action lawsuits, in which even the collective status of the plaintiffs does little to cover the individual
risk. Id at 1106. Having to "opt in" to a wage theft class action (as contrasted, for example, with an "opt
out" consumer rights lawsuit) "requires [low-wage] workers to take the very public step ofjoining a lawsuit,
rather than being part of an anonymous class represented by a few named plaintiffs. Id at 1113.
73. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-II(D)

https://oucampustest.sjsu.edu/people/stan.malos/courses/busl57/outlines/topic3
(1998),
/eeoc%20compliance%20manual.pdf.
74. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018).
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from pursuing wage theft claims in state and federal courts, 75 the Trump
Administration's resource retrenchment, "deregulatory impulses," and
continued decline of union representation,76 the need for creative
enforcement mechanisms has never been greater.77
While the right of workers to be paid in full the wages to which they
are legally owed is unwavering, whether or not that right is effectively
enforced depends heavily on political support and its attendant
resources. 78 In contrast to Bush-era Department of Labor (hereinafter
"DOL") policy, the Obama administration's Wage and Hour Division was
noted for its new era of vigorous and strategic enforcement." 79 Then, like a
pendulum swinging backward, the Trump administration made decisive,
unprecedented moves in the reverse direction. 80 These included lowering the

75.

Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON. POL'Y INST. 1,

7 (Apr. 6, 2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/144131.pdf (showing a recent study that suggests that more
than 55 percent of employees are now subject to mandatory arbitration clauses, which has stripped
non-union workers in New York the right to go to court).
76. See, e.g., Daniel Schneider & Kristen Harknett, Essential and Vulnerable: Service-Sector
Workers and Paid Sick Leave, THE SHIFT PROJECT 3, 4 (Apr. 2020), https://shift.berkeley.edu/files
("Union
/2020/04/Essential_andVulnerable_Service_Sector_Workers_and_PaidSick_Leave.pdf
membership is uncommon among our surveyed workers at 123 large retail and food-service firms, at
just about 9%. But, workers who reported being in a union were significantly more likely to report

access to paid sick leave-49% of union workers had paid sick leave versus 44% of non-unionized
workers."). "[S]ome companies-such as Costco and In-N-Out Burger-have offered their workers
access to paid sick leave even in the absence of legislative requirements." Id. at 6.
77. Kate Hamaji et al., Unchecked Corporate Power: Forced Arbitration, the Enforcement
Crisis, and How Workers are Fighting Back, CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY & ECON. POL'Y INST.
2019),
https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Unchecked-Corporate-Power3
(May

web.pdf. As has been well documented, arbitrators-frequently aligned with the interests of
employers-are more likely to rule in favor of corporate employers than the employees alleging

violations of labor and employment laws. Id. In cases where employees do prevail, arbitrators are
more likely to award lesser amounts in damages than a judge or jury may have. Id. These limitations
have been "ratified by the U.S. Supreme Court," through a series of decisions that upheld forced
arbitration. See also Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S.Ct. 1407 (2019) (holding that even an
ambiguous arbitration clause can be construed to prevent a worker from arbitratingtheir claims on a

class-wide basis); see generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011); Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612
(2018).
78. Kennedy, supra note 37, at 532.
79. Id. at 534-35 ("[T]he WH has hired 300 new investigators to target industries and employers most

likely to violate workplace

standards, resulting in a recovery of over $1.3 billion in unpaid and owed wages...

Under [David] Weil's leadership, efforts to crack down on employee misclassification have yielded
significant gains for workers in industries that frequently turn to subcontracting as a way to cut costs and

avoid responsibility for labor standards. The DOL has also begun to more aggressively partner with state
governments and industry partners to strengthen enforcement efforts.").
80. Celine McNicholas et al., Unprecedented: The Trump NLRB's Attack on Workers' Rights,

ECON. POL'Y INST. 1 (Oct. 16, 2019), https://files.epi.org/pdf/177387.pdf.

See also Suzy Khimm,

Trump Administration's Rollback of Worker Protection Rules is Under Investigation, NBC NEWS

(Jan. 31, 2019, 3:24 PM) https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-administration-s-
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salary threshold for exempting workers from overtime pay eligibility; 81
making it more difficult to hold employers liable for wage theft against
contract and franchise workers;8 2 ending a requirement that contractors meet
federal labor standards in order to do business with the federal government, 83
and upholding the use of mandatory arbitration clauses and class action
waivers in low-wage workplaces, which has a disproportionately adverse
impact on women and frontline workers of color. 84 Given these continual
shifts at the federal level, worker advocates have successfully sought to
raise the floor on wages and working conditions by pushing for more
protective laws at the state and local levels.85
C. State and Local Initiativesand their Limitations
Prior to the outbreak of the novel coronavirus in early 2020, state and
local governments had experimented with various means of raising the floor
on wages and benefits, bridging the widening gaps in federal workplace

rollback-worker-protection-rules-under-investigation-n964836.

In January 2019, Scott Dahl, the

Inspector General for the Department of Labor, responded to a request by several Democratic
Senators, including Elizabeth Warren, that Dahl investigate whether the DOL deviated from agency
regulatory and data quality requirements when the DOL issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to

remove operation of power-driven patient lifts from the list of prohibited activities for 16- and 17year old workers. Id.
81. See Saharra Griffin & Malkie Wall, President Trump'sAnti-Worker Agenda, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS ACTION FUND (Aug. 28, 2019, 10:09 AM) https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues
(explaining that the
/economy/reports/2019/08/28/174893/president-trumps-anti-worker-agenda/
change is estimated to shortchange workers an estimated $1.2 billion in annual earnings).
82. U.S. Department of Labor's PAID Program Helps Workers and Employers as America
Reopens, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB. (July 14, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd

/whd20200714.
83. David Madland & Karla Walter, Column: President Trump has Betrayed U.S. Workers,
THE DET. NEWS (Mar. 30, 2017, 12:07 AM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2017/03/30

/trump-workers/99797638/.
84. Justicefor Sale: How CorporationsUse ForcedArbitration to Exploit Working Families,
THE CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, 1, 16 (May 2017), https://www.populardemocracy.org/sites

/default/files/Forced-Arbitrationweb%20%283%29

0.pdf; Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use

of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON. POL'Y INST., 1, 7 (Apr. 6, 2018) https://www.epi.org/files/pdf
/144131.pdf (explaining that in California two-thirds of non-union workers have been forced into
mandatory arbitration); see also Kate Hamaji et al., Unchecked CorporatePower:ForcedArbitration,
the Enforcement Crisis, andHow Workers are FightingBack, THE CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY
& ECON. POL'Y INST. 1 (May 2019) https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/UncheckedCorporate-Power-web.pdf.
85. David Madland & Alex Rowell, How State andLocal Governments Can Strengthen Worker
Power and Raise Wages, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND 3 (May 2, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://
www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/05/02/166640/state-localgovernments-can-strengthen-worker-power-raise-wages/.
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protections and strengthening enforcement. 86 Such experiments, conducted
by states like California, Maryland, New York and Connecticut, included the
passage of legislation that required employers to notify their employees of the
method of payment and amount of wages owed, and by enhancing criminal
penalties for employers who committed wage theft. 87 Similarly, the California
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement began conducting more focused
investigations of employers within targeted industries during nonbusiness
hours. 88 Likewise, in New York, the Attorney General has prioritized
investigation and enforcement against employers who have repeatedly
violated wage and hour laws, specifically targeting employers in certain
industries. 9 These state and local efforts, while critically important, are
insufficient to raise standards for low-wage workers nationwide. As
predicted by Professors Fine and Gordon, since many of these state and local
initiatives have emerged on an adhoc basis, rather than through institutional
policy, they may be difficult to sustain in the face of COVID-19 era budget
cuts or political regime change. 90 Enforcement strategies driven by workers,
rather than regulators, may help overcome these persistent barriers to achieving
91
greater stability and sustainability within frontline industries.
New York is a particularly interesting case study for wage theft, as its state
legislature has passed some of the strongest worker protections in the nation,
including a $15 minimum wage bill, 92 Domestic Worker Bill of Rights,93 paid

86.

Peter Romer-Friedman, Eliot Spitzer Meets Mother Jones: How State Attorneys General

Can Enforce State Wage and Hour Laws, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 495, 511-18 (2006)
(detailing the enforcement regimes of California, Maine, and Massachusetts).
87.

See Kennedy, supranote 37, at 536 n. 93.

88. JULIE A. Su, STATE OF CAL. LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV. AGENCY, A REPORT ON THE STATE
OF THE DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT 1, 2 (2013), http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse
/Publications/DLSE_Report2013.pdf ("In 2012, BOFE's more targeted, efficient use of inspections
yielded the highest rate of civil penalty citations (80%) in the past 10 years.")
89. Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement Through
Partnershipswith Workers' Organizations,38 POL. & SOC'Y 552, 568-70 (2010). In 2009, the New

York State Department of Labor launched a "Wage and Hour Watch" program, in which the DOL
formally partnered with six community-based organizations (Make the Road New York, the
Workplace Project, Centro del Derecho, Chinese Staff and Workers Association, RWDSU, and
UFCW Local #1500) using a "neighborhood watch" model of workplace enforcement. Id. at 584
n.110; see also Romer-Friedman, supra note 86, at 528 ("When the [New York Labor] Bureau
receives a complaint from a worker about a specific employer, it investigates every possible violation

by that employer, and prioritizes complaints in which similar employers are committing violations.").
90. Fine & Gordon, supra note 89, at 561.
91. Id.
92. State Minimum Wages, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS (Jan. 8, 2021), https://
see also
www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-minimum-wage-chart.aspx#Table;
COMING UP SHORT: THE STATE OF WAGE THEFT ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK, supra note 57, at 3.
CONSUMER AFFAIRS, WORKERS' BILL OF RIGHTS (2018), https://
93. See N.Y.C.
wwwl .nyc.gov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/workers/Workers-Bill-of-Rights.pdf.
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family leave, 94 and specific legislation to combat wage theft. 95 Despite strong
protections on the books, workers' wages are being stolen off the shop floor by
employers at pervasive and significant rates.9 6 Nearly one in five low-wage
workers has been the victim of wage theft, in an amount equal to $965 million
in unpaid minimum wages per year. 97 This crisis disproportionately affects
women and frontline workers of color.98 In a study by Make the Road New
York, severe underfunding of the New York State Department of Labor has
decimated the annual amounts it can recover for workers, down to less than
three percent of minimum wages stolen by employers. 99 For example, in 2008,
each DOL investigator had a caseload of about seventy-three workers; 100 in
2017, that number was approximately 142 cases per investigator, with no
improvements in technology or efficiency that would help investigators handle
the two-fold increase in cases.1 01
As an alternative to legislative and administrative tactics, workers have
organized labor unions, cooperatives, and collectives as a means of
generating stable employment and living wages, building collective political
power, and enforcing workplace standards.10 2 As Fine and Gordon note, the
original architects of the FLSA envisioned an enforcement system in which
worker-based organizations would directly participate in enforcing wage
and hour laws. 103 They advocate for augmenting existing government
enforcement by giving unions and worker organizations a formal role in
enforcing compliance with minimum wage and overtime laws in low-wage
industries.1 04 The strategies proposed in the next part also rest on the
principle that those "closest to the action" be empowered to work with
government in order to detect, report, and prevent wage theft. 105

94. See N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 204 (McKinney 2020).
95. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF LAB., https://dol.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2021/03/p715.pdf
(Apr. 24, 2021).
96.

See Cooper & Kroeger, supra note 53.

97.
98.

Id.
Id.

99. See COMING UP SHORT: THE STATE OF WAGE THEFT ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK, supra
note 57, at 14 ("The DOL has insufficient resources to manage growing caseloads. DOL investigators'
caseloads have grown extensively over the past decade, becoming too large to effectively manage.").

100. Id.
101.

Id. ("[T]he DOL has fewer than half the investigators than it had several decades ago. In

1966, the DOL had over 300 labor inspectors. As of the end of 2017, the DOL had 115 investigate
officers handling 16,400 open cases.").
102.

See generally Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the

Dream, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 417, 417-18 (2005) (documenting the efforts of various worker
centers).

103.
104.
105.

Fine & Gordon, supranote 89, at 556.
Id. at 556, 561 (such collaborations must be "formalized," "sustained," and "vigorous").
See infra Section III.
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Professor Fine defines co-enforcement as "when unions, worker centers
and other community-based non-profit organizations and high-road firms, in
relationship with government inspectors, help educate workers on their rights
and patrol their labor markets to identify businesses engaged in unethical and
illegal practices."1 06 Co-enforcement represents a shift away from viewing
regulation as a coercive function of the state, to a process that leverages
workers' unique knowledge of shop floor conditions and non-compliance
with standards.1 07 Before workers can enforce equitable workplace rights,
however, those standards must be put into place with a new approach,
described in the next sections, to raise the wage floor for frontline workers.
II.

RAISING THE WAGE FLOOR

A.

The CARES Act ParadigmShift

While raising the wage floor for workers is an essential anti-poverty
measure, minimum wages remain insufficient to propel workers forward
in an economically meaningful way. Traditionally, collective bargaining
was the means through which workers could command higher, more
livable wages that reflected the true value of their labor.1 08 Today,
however, private sector union density has dipped below 10%, putting
collective bargaining out of reach for most. 109 One statutory means of
ensuring higher wages is through the application of the Davis-Bacon Act,
the Service-Contract Act, and their state and local counterparts, which
establish a process for determining "prevailing" wages in the construction
and service industries, which are usually higher than the relevant
minimum standards.110 The next sections will provide an overview of
these tools and suggest ways they may be applied to cover workers in
more frontline industries.

106. Janice Fine, New Approaches to Enforcing Labor Standards: How Co-enforcement
PartnershipsBetween Government and Civil Society are Showing the Way Forward, 2017 U. CHI.

LEGAL F. 143, 146 (2017).
107. Id. at 147, 151 ("[O]ne of the most commonly cited capabilities that worker organizations
have is access to vast amounts of information on labor standards that would be difficult for state

officials to gather alone.").
108.

See Lawrence Mishel et al., Explainingthe ErosionofPrivate-SectorUnions, ECON. POL'Y

INST. 1, 1-3 (Nov. 18, 2020), https://files.epi.org/pdf/215908.pdf.
109. Id. at 9.
110. Malkie wall et al., Prevailing Wages: Frequently Asked Questions, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Dec. 22, 2020, 9:07 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports

/2020/12/22/494144/prevailing-wages-frequently-asked-questions/.
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Two key rationales undergird the concept of prevailing wages. The
first was frequently articulated by Samuel Gompers, who argued that
workers on public projects should be paid the "current or prevailing" daily
wage simply because the government should, through its own hiring and
compensation policies, "set a good example for the private sector."" The
second rationale is that in the context of public works the "government,
as a major purchaser of construction [labor], should not benefit at the
expense of wage earners" (whose tax dollars ostensibly underwrite the
projects themselves).' 1 2 A contemporary rationale for expanding the
reach of prevailing wage laws to more frontline industries is that such an
expansion would reduce the strain on the social safety net provided by
local, state, and federal governments.' 1 3 In the coming post-pandemic
economic recovery, that safety net will be stretched to catch an
unprecedented number of individuals and families. 1 4 In a study of public
school cafeteria workers, the University of California Berkeley Labor
Center found that public
school cafeteria workers are nearly twice as likely as the
workforce as a whole to participate in one or more public
programs: 36.3 percent compared to 19.7 percent. The highest
participation is in the Earned Income Tax Credit (31.4 percent),
followed by Children's Medicaid or SCHIP (15.3 percent),

111. Wage Law History, Nw. FAIR CONTRACTING ASS'N, http://www.nwfca.org/wage-lawhistory/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2021).
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 650 (Consol. 2021).
There are persons employed in some occupations in the state of New York at wages
insufficient to provide adequate maintenance for themselves and their families. Such

employment impairs the health, efficiency, and well-being of the persons so employed,
constitutes unfair competition against other employers and their employees, threatens the

stability of industry, reduces the purchasing power of employees, and requires, in many
instances, that wages be supplemented by the payment of public moneys for relief or other
public and private assistance. Employment of persons at these insufficient rates of pay
threatens the health and well-being of the people of this state and injures the overall
economy.

Accordingly, it is the declared policy of the state of New York that such conditions be
eliminated as rapidly as practicable without substantially curtailing opportunities for
employment or earning power. To this end minimum wage standards shall be established
and maintained.

Id.
114. Id. (showing the reliance of individuals and families on public assistance, as mentioned in
the statute, will grow.).
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Medicaid (14 percent), Food Stamps (8.5 percent) and TANF (1.7
percent).115
By providing these workers with higher "prevailing wages," rather
than the minimum wages they were then earning, the state and local
governments would recoup an even greater amount through parallel
reductions in public program expenditures. 1 6
On March 27, 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security (CARES) Act.' 17 This law signaled a key
paradigm shift for independent contractors who have been long excluded
8
In a dramatic
from most federal and state workplace protections.1"
departure from established federal precedent, the CARES act created
"Pandemic Unemployment Assistance," to provide unemployment
insurance (hereinafter "UT") benefits to workers who otherwise would not
normally receive such benefits, such as independent contractors, selfemployed and other on-demand or "gig" workers."'9 Unlike traditional
employees, whose employers will verify their UT status, the CARES Act
requires that non-traditional workers self-certify "that he or she is able and
available to work within the meaning of applicable state law, and is
115.

Ken Jacobs & Dave Graham-Squire, Labor Standards for School Cafeteria Workers,

Turnover and Public ProgramUtilization, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 447, 454-55 (2010).
116. Id. at 457-58.
117. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 9001 (west 2020).
118. See Guide to Independent Contractors'CARES Act Relief; U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., https://
www.uschamber.com/report/independent-contractors-guide-cares-act-relief (last visited Apr. 20,
2021); see also Elizabeth J. Kennedy, Employed by an Algorithm: Labor Rights in the On-Demand

Economy, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 987, 998-99 (2017).
The cornerstone of the organizational structure of most on-demand firms is the

classification of its workforce as independent contractors, rather than as employees. The
decision to structure the workplace in this way has immediate, as well as collateral
consequences for workers, consumers, and the economy as a whole. Under U.S. law,
employers have considerable incentive to classify their workers as independent contractors
ratherthan as employees. Employers are required to pay employment taxes for employees,
but not for independent contractors. In addition, employers are required to respect
minimum wage and overtime standards for employees, but not for independent

contractors. Federal labor and employment laws impose other financial and legal
obligations on employers, including liability for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1963, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act; a duty to provide employees with unpaid leave pursuant to the Family
and Medical Leave Act; requirements with regard to pension plans; and an obligation to
negotiate wages and working conditions with eligible employees under the National Labor

Relations Act (NLRA).
Id.
119. Ally Schweitzer, What Gig Workers Need to Know About Collecting Unemployment, NPR
(Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.npr.org/local/305/2020/04/13/833332449/what-gig-workers-need-toknow-about-collecting-unemployment.
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'unemployed, partially unemployed or unable or unavailable to work'
because of one or more [] COVID-19-related reasons." 120 The CARES
Act expanded the definition of workers eligible to receive benefits,
increased the amount of benefit available, and extended the number of
weeks that a worker may receive the benefit.121 This represented a
significant paradigm shift, one arguably toward a universal basic income
framework, and one that recognized the inadequacy of existing federal
minimum wage standards. During economic crises, the impact of missing
or subminimum wages on industries such as retail, restaurants, hospitality,
are magnified. What was previously an individual struggle, becomes a
larger economic catastrophe. 22

120. Andrew Massara & Thomas McInerney, The CARES Act andIts Impact on Independent
Contractors and Gig Workers, JDSUPRA (Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-

cares-act-and-its-impact-on-99200/. COVID-19-related reasons include:
"
He or she is diagnosed with COVID-19
He or she has symptoms of COVID-19 and is in the process of seeking a
"
medical diagnosis
"
A household member has been diagnosed with COVID-19
He or she is providing care to a household member with COVID-19
"
"
A child or other person in the household for which the individual is the primary
"

"
"
"
"
"
"

caregiver is unable to attend school or daycare due to COVID-19
The individual is unable to reach work due to a quarantine

The individual is unable to attend work because a healthcare professional
advised him or her to self-quarantine
The individual is scheduled to commence employment and does not have a job
or is unable to reach the job as a direct result of COVID-19
The individual is the sole wage earner in his or her household due to death of
the head of household as a direct result of COVID-19
The individual was required to quit his or her job as a direct result of COVID19
The individual's place of employment closed as a direct result of COVID-19
The individual is self-employed, is seeking part-time employment, and does
not have sufficient work history or otherwise would not qualify for
unemployment benefits under another state unemployment program.

The CARES Act does not define what it means to be 'required to quit his or her job
as a direct result of COVID-19.' The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) is likewise
ambiguous and refers simply to 'leav[ing] employment due to a risk of exposure or
infection....' We anticipate that the analysis will be guided by a reasonableness
standard."

Id.
121. Blau et al., supranote 5.
122. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that U.S. unemployment rates will remain
above eight percent through 2021 and that this recession will lead to a loss of $15.7 trillion in gross
domestic product by 2030. CONG. BUDGET OFF., INTERIM ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR 2020 AND

2021 (2020), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56368; Letter from Phillip L. Swagel, Dir., Cong.
Budget Off., to Charles Schumer, Sen., New York State (June 1, 2020), https://www.cbo.gov/system
/files/2020-06/56376-GDP.pdf.
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Any post-pandemic economic recovery legislation will likely require
large-scale jobs components, which seek to off stave hemorrhaging
unemployment rates and put people back to work. 12 3 The unique
opportunity of this moment presents itself through such programs, since
they would trigger the application of two major pieces of federal
legislation requiring the payment of prevailing wages in federal contracts,
the Davis-Bacon Act and the Service Contract Act, as well as various state
and local counterparts, each of which explored below.
B. Expanding the Davis-Bacon Act
Enacted in 1931, the Davis-Bacon Act (hereinafter "DBA") was
intended to protect local businesses and workers from non-local
contractors underbidding for federal construction projects using wagerates that, while competitive in the non-local contractor's geographic area,
would be significantly less than those demanded in the region of the
project site.12 4 The DBA requires that for any contract with the U.S.
government or District of Columbia in excess of $2,000, contractors and
their subcontractors must pay their workers "prevailing wages and fringe
benefits" as established by the Department of Labor.12 5 The DBA covers
projects that involve "the construction, alteration, or repair . . . of public
buildings or public works." 12 6
In addition to the DBA itself, "approximately" sixty additional
federal statutes include prevailing wage provisions.12 7 These are referred
to collectively as the Davis-Bacon Related Acts (hereinafter "DBRAs"),
and apply to "construction projects through grants, loans, loan guarantees,
and insurance." 12 8 These can include
construction in such areas as transportation, housing, air and water
pollution reduction, and health. If a construction project is funded or
123. Based on household survey data, "[t]he unemployment rate declined by 1.4 percentage
points to 13.3 percent in May, and the number of unemployed persons fell by 2.1 million to 21.0
million." U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION-MAY 2020
(2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_06052020.htm#. Unemployment rates
among Latinx, Black, and Asian workers were much higher-17.6 percent, 16.8 percent, and 15
percent, respectively-compared with white workers, at 12.4 percent. Id.

124.

See 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3148 (West 2006).

125. Davis-Bacon and Related Acts, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB.: WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, https://
www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/government-contracts/construction (last visited February 27, 2021).

126.

Id.

127. What are the Davis-Bacon and Related Acts?, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB.:WAGE & HOUR
DIVISION, https://www.dol.gov/whd/programs/ dbra/whatdbra.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).

128.

Id.
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assisted under more than one Federal statute, the Davis-Bacon
prevailing wage provisions may apply to the project if any of the
129
applicable statutes requires payment of Davis-Bacon wage rates.

DBRAs have been credited with lifting generations of skilled trades
workers out of poverty, as well as saving taxpayers from poor quality
public workers projects and reducing strain on the public social safety net
through a reduction in workplace injuries. 130
The Moving Forward Act, a $1.5 trillion congressional proposal to
spur economic recovery through physical infrastructure projects, is an
example of the kind of federal works program the DBA was intended to
cover. 131 In addition to traditional construction projects related to
highway, rail and transit systems, the Moving Forward Act includes
investments in "health care, airports, clean energy, broadband, education,
and drinking water infrastructure."' 32
Ensuring an equitable distribution of the economic benefits reaped
from such large-scale public works projects will require two key elements.
First, DBA prevailing wage and federal contractor affirmative action
requirements must be included in all projects that receive federal grants,
loans, loan guarantees and tax credits. 133 An economic recovery of the
size and scope contemplated will not be administered exclusively by the
federal government.' 34 It will likely take the form of federally funded and
supported state and local projects.131 Second, given the geographical and
racial inequities in prevailing wages across the country, in occupations

129. Id.
130. According to a 2004-2013 study, construction workers in states with strong or average
prevailing wage laws made nearly $12,000 more per year, on average, than construction workers in
states with weak or no prevailing wage laws. FRANK MANZO IV ET AL., THE ECONOMIC, FISCAL, AND
SOCIAL IMPACTS OF STATE PREVAILING WAGE LAWS: CHOOSING BETWEEN THE HIGH ROAD AND
THE LOW ROAD IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 1, 17 (2016), http://www.faircontracting.org/wp-

content/uploads/2016/02/P W-national-impact-study-FINAL2.9.16.pdf.
131. See Moving Forward Act, H.R. 2, 116th Cong. (2020); see also Karla Walter, Getting
Americans Back to Work and Good Jobs, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1 (June 29, 2020), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2020/06/29/487075/getting-americans-backwork-good-jobs/.
132. Walter, supra note 35, at 1. "[T]he Moving Forward Act extends Davis-Bacon coverage to
several spending programs; helps expand registered apprenticeship in surface transportation projects;
and requires major purchases of transit vehicles to include incentives for manufacturers to pay decent
wages as well as provide apprenticeships and recruit traditionally underrepresented labor. In addition,
the package incorporates provisions of the Investing in a New vision for the Environment and Surface
Transportation (INVEST) in America Act to boost transparency and adopt guardrails to ensure that
recipients meet labor and Buy America requirements." Id. at 3.

133. Id.
134. Id. at 1-2.
135. Id. at 2.
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with low levels of union membership, a minimum floor of fifteen dollars
per hour and paid sick leave should be required for all recipients of
infrastructure funds. 136 Using the rationales articulated for the DBA,
advocates have called for an even more expansive set of benefits to attach
to all publicly funded and supported projects, including "fair scheduling
protections, extended paid family and medical leave, and access to quality
37
and affordable child care."1
C. Expanding the Service ContractAct
While the Davis-Bacon Act covers construction, alteration, repair,
painting, and decorating, significant federal dollars are spent on public
works that take different forms. The Service Contract Act (hereinafter
"SCA") was enacted in 1965, largely in response to demands that
government contracting in connection with President Kennedy's space
program include the same kind of prevailing wage protections required
38
for government construction contracts under Davis-Bacon.1 Passed in
1965, and significantly revised in 1972, the list of what constitutes
39
Initially, "services" meant food
"services," has evolved considerably.1
services or janitorial services, such as the workers in the cafeteria in any
40
federal building, most of which are contracted out.'
Like the Davis-Bacon Act, the SCA requires that for any contract or
subcontract over $2,500, contractors and subcontractors pay no less than
the prevailing wage rate in their local area for classes of workers that are
4
established by the federal Department of Labor.1 ' The secretary of labor
42
is instructed to set rates comparable to other federal government jobs.
In setting the rates, the secretary must give due consideration to wage
43
levels paid for comparable federal government jobs, and give deference
to wages negotiated in a collective bargaining agreement. If a prior

136. Id. at 4.
137. Id.
138.

Symposium, Paving the High Road: Labor Standards and Procurement Policy in the

Obama Era, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 349, 353-54 (2010) [hereinafter Pavingthe High Road].
139. Id. at 354.
140. Id.
141. 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(1) (2006); see also 2018 P.R. Laws 154. A service contract is a written
obligation agreed upon by "an agency, public corporation, or instrumentality of the Government,"
pursuant to which a person (natural or juridical) has an "obligation to provide certain services to the
Government for" an agreed amount of compensation. Id.

142. 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(1).
143. Id. § 351(a)(5).
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contractor was covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the
collectively bargained rates are applied. 1
One glaring exception to the application of the Service Contract Act
is that unlike state and local projects which, if they are funded in any
amount with federal dollars are subject to Davis-Bacon prevailing wage
requirements, state and local service contracts that use federal dollars are
not subject to the Service Contract Act.1 45 Therefore, any federal recovery
program would need to ensure that prevailing wages are attached as a
condition with every federal grant of monies to underwrite state and local
projects, a critical and necessary expansion of the SCA.1 46
D. Expanding the Definition of Public Works
As we consider an expanded application of prevailing wage
principles, it is important to note that the Davis-Bacon Act was not the
first law to establish prevailing wage requirements for public projects. In
fact, the first such prevailing wage law was enacted 130 years ago in
Kansas.1 47 The principle of government leading by example was at the
heart of the movement for a "living wage," which crystalized in its modern
context in Baltimore in the 1990s.1 48 Arguing that when the government
spends money to create jobs the belief that it ought to lead by example,
was embedded in the living wage ordinance passed in Baltimore in 1994,
which required that employers doing business with the city government

144. Paving the High Road, supra note 138, at 354-55. This provision is a notable distinction
between the Service Contract Act and the Davis-Bacon Act and reflects an intention of Congress at
the time the SCA was amended in 1972 to protect "high-road employers" from being outbid by "lowroad" employers whose workers had not successfully organized and collectively negotiated higher
wages. Id.
145. Id. at 355.
146. See id. at 355.
147. Id. at 353, 353 n.10 (citing Eight-Hour Law, Kansas Gen. Stats. §§ 3827-3829 (1891))
("[E]ight hours shall constitute a day's work for all laborers, workmen, mechanics, or other persons
now employed, or who may hereafter be employed by or on behalf of the State of Kansas, or by or on

behalf of any county, city, township, or other municipality of said state ...

provided, that in all such

cases, the laborer, workmen, mechanics, or other persons so employed and working to exceed eight

hours per calendar day shall be paid on the basis of eight hours constituting a day's work: provided
further, that not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed

shall be paid to laborers, workmen, mechanics, and other persons so employed by or on behalf of the
State of Kansas, or any county, city, township, or other municipal of said state, and laborers, workmen,
mechanics, and other persons employed by contractors or sub-contractors in the execution of any
contract or contracts within the State of Kansas, or within any county, city, township, or other

municipality thereof shall be deemed to be employed by or on behalf of the State of Kansas or of such
county, city, township, or other municipality thereof.").
148. Id. at 373.
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49
This
would be required to pay "living wages" to their employees.1
movement caught on, as similar ordinances were passed by city
governments across the country.15 0 The ethos that companies seeking
public subsidies should be therefore obligated to provide more generous
compensation and benefits than the private market would require fueled
the passage of more than 150 such laws over the following decade."'
Similar requirements for state subsidized jobs also eventually took hold,
and backlash legislation banning such policies, such as in Texas, but in
general they generated a robust movement for living wages across the
country. 5
Rather than taking a narrow view of projects that fall under
prevailing wage protections, all work that is done for a public purpose,
such as projects funded in whole or in part by public grants, governmentbacked loans, or with tax-credits, should be required to use predominant
collectively bargained wages in a region and industry as the prevailing
wage. 53 Expanding the use of prevailing wages would help not only the
directly affected workers, but also so-called "high road employers," who
would otherwise be undercut by companies that underpay their employees
in order to secure government contracts. 5 4 Though signed at a moment
in which construction in New York State was effectively brought to a halt
by the coronavirus, the $177 billion spending plan for fiscal year 2020-21
expanded prevailing wage laws to cover workers on certain private
construction projects. 155

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Madland & Rowell, supranote 85, at 5.
154. Id. at 5. An expanded use of wage boards is another idea worth exploring to help raise
standards within industries. In a handful of states, including New York, New Jersey and California
such boards are comprised of workers, employers, and public officials who help set minimum working
standards for industries and occupations. Id. at 8. Minimum standards are established through a mix
of "economic and social factors such as industry productivity and cost of living, as well as testimony
from business owners, workers, and other stakeholders." Id. at 5. See Kate Andrias et al., A How-To
Guidefor State and Local Workers' Boards, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 4 (Dec. 11, 2019, 9:04 AM),
9 2
2
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/ 01 /1 / 11/478539/guide-state-localworkers-boards/. For workers who are not covered by the National Labor Relations Act, or NLRA,

wage boards could even directly promote sectoral bargaining. Id. New York has used wage boards
to raise the wages of fast food workers to $15 an hour in 2015, and more recently passed legislation
establishing a farm laborer wage board. Id. The city of Seattle created a wage board in 2018 for
domestic workers, such as nannies, housekeepers and elder care providers. Id. Given the current
national attention focused on frontline workers, opportunities to expand and extend wage boards to

help raise standards in frontline industries may be an option worth pursuing. See id.
155. See Francis Lowe, New York Expands PrevailingWage to Private Projects,ABC (Apr. 8,
2020, 1:40 PM), https://www.abc.org/News-Media/Newsline/entryid/17168/new-york-expands-
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As discussed above, the Davis-Bacon Act, unlike the SCA, extends
prevailing wage requirements to state and local projects that use federal
dollars. As those federal dollars trickle downstream to state and local
agencies, the rights of workers laboring on those projects trickle down
into those local economies. 156 Significantly, the very definition of
"dollars" was given a more expansive interpretation under the prior
federal administration. In 2009, Congress passed the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (hereinafter "ARRA") which, for the first time,
extended Davis-Bacon coverage to public works funded through the
purchase of tax-exempt bonds by private investors (not direct taxpayer
dollars).157 Prior to the passage of the ARRA, the DBRA had covered
grants, federal loans, federal loan guarantees, mortgage insurance,
revolving loan banks, and other ways in which the federal government
extends money to states and municipalities; but it had never applied to "a
creature of the tax code." 158 The more expansive prevailing wage
requirements embedded in the ARRA provided some creative inspiration
for extending the application of Davis-Bacon to new instruments of

financing. 159
One broad area in which prevailing wages might most appropriately
be extended is in the case of economic development programs. Cities
around the country have embraced a model of development centered on
Tax Increment Financing (hereinafter "TIF"). 160 Such projects typically
use a spectrum of financial incentives, including tax breaks, direct grants,
and commitments for infrastructure improvements for employers seeking
to relocate. 161 Critics of these programs argue that in the absence of
prevailing wage or living wage commitments, there is no meaningful
public return on the public investment in private companies. 6 2 By
negotiating community benefits agreements, labor unions and community
activists have, on a project-by-project basis, been able to eke out greater
benefits for employees and disrupt the trend toward "poverty jobs" for
prevailing-wage-to-private-projects; see also Stephen D. Rosemarino & Chad J. Caplan, New York to
Require Contractors to Pay Prevailing Wages on CertainPrivateProjects, NYSBA (June 12, 2020),
https://nysba.org/new-york-to-require-contractors-to-pay-prevailing-wages-on-certain-private-

projects/ (explaining the passage of a $177 billion budget bill).
156. See generally Paving the High Road, supra note 138, at 351 (discussing disbursement of
billions of dollars in grants and loans by federal agencies to the states).
157. See generally id. at 355 (discussing the structure of the ARRA and the five tax credit bonds

funded under the ARRA).
158. Id. at 355-56.
159. Id. at 356.
160. Id. at 375.
161. Id.
162. See id.
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public project. 163 Examples of this approach can be seen in Los Angeles,
Pittsburgh, New York and Chicago.'4
III.

DEPUTIZING FRONTLINE WORKERS

A. Federaland State False Claims Acts
In addition to the "proactive" regime of DOL-WHD investigations,
enforcing workplace standards in the United States also relies heavily on a
system of "operational rights"-incentives for workers to bring individual
and collective claims from the "bottom up." 165 Most laws-federal, state,
and local-that establish workplace standards provide employees with the
right to bring a private lawsuit against an employer that violates those
standards. 166 The number of private lawsuits filed by employees seeking
redress eclipses the number of enforcement actions initiated by the
government.1 67 Advocates for new models of workplace rights enforcement,
particularly in low-wage industries, have recommended that the bottom-up
structure be preserved but strengthened by a system that rebalances the costs
and benefits in ways that benefit both employers' 68 and employees.1 69 For
ethical, law-abiding employers who also operate on low profit margins, a
system that more effectively enforces wage standards could allow them to
compete on a more level playing field, rather than being forced to compete
with unscrupulous employers whose law breaking gives them an economic
advantage.170 The following sections propose a two-step strategy for
leveraging public reinvestment dollars toward raising wage standards across

163. Id.
164. Id. at 375-376 (Los Angeles and Pittsburgh have institutionalized these standards with
living wage and prevailing wage standards with similar proposals in New York and Chicago to do the
same).
165.

Alexander & Prasad, supranote 63, at 1069-73.

166. Id. at 1070.
167. Id.
168. Elizabeth J. Kennedy & Michael B. Runnels, Bringing New Governance Home: The Need
for Regulation in the Domestic Workplace, 81 UMKC L. REv. 899, 940-41 (2013) (summarizing the
system of "co-regulation" as put forth by Professor Cynthia Estlund which "supports the initiatives
of 'high road' domestic employers-and equips domestic workers and their employers with the tools
necessary to develop enforceable workplace agreements based on core industry standards and mutual
interests").

169. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 63, at 1108. One suggestion is for the U.S. Department of
Labor to "establish an optional, one-way binding arbitration system, modeled on a program in place

at The Coca-Cola Company, [which] would give workers a forum for speedy claim resolution." Id.
at 1114. Under the Coca-Cola system, only the employer would be bound by the arbitrator's decision.
Id. at 1115. The workers would still be free to pursue their claims extemally. Id.
170. Kennedy, supra note 37, at 560.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol38/iss2/2

28

Kennedy: Deputizing the Frontline: Enforcing Workplace Rights in a Post-Pa
DEPUTIZING THE FRONTLINE

2021 ]

231

industries. First is the expansion of the DBA and SCA and their related state
and local counterparts to all public projects funded by public dollars or
Then, as a bottom-up
through public-private investment vehicles.
enforcement tool, deputize frontline workers to enforce those higher
standards using qui tam actions pursuant to the federal False Claims Act or
its state and local counterparts.
Congress enacted the False Claims Act in 1863 in response to
concerns of rampant fraud by suppliers of goods to the Union Army
during the Civil War.171 Reports include those of mortar shells filled with
sawdust instead of gunpowder, buttons that dissolved entirely in the first
rain, and the same mules being sold multiple times over.1 72 In an effort
"[t]o stop this 'rebellion' and 'put fraudulent contractors in a position
where they may be punished for their frauds,' Congress passed the False
Claims Act." 173 Given the federal government's limited enforcement
resources at the time, the key to the success of the FCA was its qui tam
provision, which allowed private citizens, or "relators" to act as
whistleblowers or "private attorneys general" by suing on behalf of the
federal government and collecting a share of its recovery. 7 4 The FCA

171.

United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (describing the "sordid picture"

painted for the Congress at the time the bill passed - a time when "the United States had been billed
for nonexistent or worthless goods, charged exorbitant prices for goods delivered, and generally
robbed in purchasing the necessities of war"). Through passage of the Act, "Congress wanted to stop
this plundering of the public treasury." Id. Some of the reports of such fraud included,
"
The same mules being sold over and over again to Army quartermasters.

"
"
"

Rotted ship hulls freshly painted to appear new then sold as new vessels to the
Navy.
Infantry boots made of cardboard which wore out after a mile of marching.
Uniform cloth made from recycled rags, which disintegrated when it became
wet.

"

Gunpowder barrels that when opened contained sawdust.

James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrityfor 150 Years for Rogues, Privateers,

Parasitesand Patriots,81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1264-65 (2013).
172.

Richard Hughes Iv, With a Worthless Services Hammer, Everything Looks Like a Nail:

LitigatingQuality of Care Underthe False ClaimsAct, 37 J. LEGAL MED. 65, 66 (2017) (citing CONG.
GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 955 (1863)).
173. Hughes IV, supranote 172, at 166 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 956 (1863);
Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696). "The act, signed by President Lincoln, was popularly
known as the Lincoln law." Id.
174. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(a)-(b) (2012) (outlining authority of DOJ and private persons to
bring suit). While the False Claims Act was born out of necessity during the Civil War, the concept
of qui tam recovery dates much earlier, to as early as 1335. See Helmer, Jr., supra note 171, at 1262.
Qui tam comes from English common law "brought by a person qui tam pro domino rege quam pro
si ipso in hacparte sequitur," or "[w]ho sues on behalf of the king as well as for himself" and appeared
on our shores as early as the first Continental Congress of the United States, which enacted several
statutes containing qui tam provisions. Id. at 1262-63; see also Vermont Agency ofNat. Res. v. United
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provided that any person who knowingly submitted false claims to the
government was liable for double the government's damages, plus a
penalty of $2,000 for each false claim; relators were originally entitled to
fifty percent of the amount recovered. 17 5 These "relators," were not
simply civilian bystanders who happened to learn of an instance of fraud.
Indeed, they were often co-conspirators who opted to betray their
confederate in exchange for the FCA bounty; the logic of the FCA was
that it operated by "setting a rogue to catch a rogue" and bring him to

justice.

17 6

-

In its current form, the FCA creates liability for any person who
knowingly submits a false claim to the government, uses a false statement to
induce the government to pay a false claim, conspires to defraud the
government into paying a false claim, or uses a false statement to reduce an
obligation to pay the government. 177 Over time, the FCA has been amended
to raise the penalties for false claims from double to treble damages 17 8 from
$2,000 to a range of $5,000 to $10,000.1 79 Relators, if successful, may collect
up to thirty percent of the recovered damages. 180 In a typical FCA case, an
internal "whistleblower" - usually an employee at a private company
reports to the government that his employer has overcharged the federal
government. 181 If the claim is correct, that whistleblower is entitled to a
portion of the monies recovered by the government.' 8 2 Using the False
Claims Act, or a state corollary, in cases of wage theft would help individual
workers and their allies to act as private whistleblowers to enforce public
labor laws.18 3 How this could work in practice is that a worker may contact
a worker center with a complaint about unpaid wages. The "false claim" by
the employer may be a certification that the employer is compliant with all

States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 776-777 (2000); Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles,
LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 382, 327 P.3d 129, 148 (2014).
175. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40785, QuI TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND
RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 5-6 (2009) (tracing the history of the contemporary FCA with reference to

the Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696 (1863)).
176. Hughes IV, supra note 172, 66.
177. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)-(b) (2012).
178. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982), with 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1986). The prior statutory penalty
of $2,000 had been set in 1863. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 4 (1986), as reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5269 ("The False Claims Act currently permits the United States to recover double damages plus $2,000 for
each false or fraudulent claim.").

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (1982), with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (1986).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)-(d) (2012).
United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir.1996).
Id. at 1266, 1269.
See supra Part I.A.
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relevant laws (which, if it is engaging in wage theft, it certainly is not).184 The
worker center, or the worker herself, would bring the claim to the state's
Department of Labor. The department would have the option of rejecting the
claim as lacking merit, pursuing the claim directly, or allowing the individual
or worker center to pursue the claim on its behalf.1 85 If the claim is successful,
the individual aggrieved worker would be entitled to the appropriate amount
of back wages and penalties, and she or the charging party (union, worker
center, co-worker advocate) would also be entitled to a portion of that
recovery. 86 The rationale for sharing the additional amount ("the bounty")
with the whistleblower (the "deputy" per this article's framework), is that he
or she has essentially saved the government money it would have had to
expend to investigate or prosecute the claim directly.1 87 One advantage of
this system is that the court could, in addition to monetary penalties, order
ongoing employer monitoring, a remedy not typically available in a private
lawsuit.
In addition to encouraging individual whistleblowers to report fraud, the
qui tam provision incentivizes lawyers and third parties to actively investigate
and look for claims.' 88 Given the significant lack of procedural legal
knowledge on the part of low-wage workers, incentives for lawyers and third
parties to look for qui tam claims are particularly important.1 89 As described
184. A claim can refer to "any communication, whether written or verbal, electronic or
otherwise, any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property...."

2018 P.R. Laws 154. This FCA theory of liability is referred to as "false certification." See Jason
Zuckerman, What Types of False Claims are Prohibitedby the False ClaimsAct?, ZUCKERMAN LAW,

https://www.zuckermanlaw.com/sp_faq/types-false-claims-prohibited-false-claims-act
/#:-:text=Legal%20Falsity%20(False%2OCertification),in%20fact%20has%20not%20complied
(Nov. 22, 2010). False certification liability can arise when a contractor submits a claim for payment

that makes specific representations about the goods or services provided, but knowingly fails to
disclose the company's noncompliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement. Id.
If that omission makes the original statements misleading, the individual or company may be found

to have violated the FCA. Id.
185. Myriam Gilles, The Politics of Access: Examining Concerted State/Private Enforcement
Solutions to Class Action Bans, 86 FORDHAM L. REv. 2223, 2236 (2018). If the government
intervenes and takes the case over, the whistleblower ("relator") stands to receive a modest fee if the
case is resolved successfully. Id. If the government merely allows the relator to prosecute the
litigation on behalf of the state, the relator stands to receive a much larger percentage of any eventual
recovery. Id The Attorney General could, "if she wishes, intervene in order to dismiss the caseexercising, in essence, a veto power over the litigation." Id.

186. Id. at 2236-37.
187. Id. at 2237.
188.

David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement's Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam

Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REv. 1913, 1944 (2014). The most common types of claims initiated under
the qui tam provision "assert fraud in connection with federally funded healthcare services under
Medicare, Medicaid, and defense-procurement contracts. Id.
189. Other recent approaches to incentivizing third parties and lawyers to ferret out fraud in
health care spending include several of the 2010 amendments passed as part of the Affordable Care
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by one qui tam lawyer, "[t]he overriding theme of the False Claims Act is
virtually to deputize an army of insiders to uncover, inform, and pursue those
government contractors who knowingly cheat in their agreements with the
government." 190 Ninety-two percent of revenues recovered under the FCA
originated from claims brought by private parties using the power of qui
tam. 191
Using the FCA to enforce minimum wage and hour standards is not a
Qui tam claims have been used to enforce prevailing wage
new idea.'9
requirements in government construction contracts at both the federal

Act, which make it easier for whistleblowers to sue on the government's behalf by limiting "Public
Disclosures" and expanding the definition of "Original Source." Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119,
ClaimsAct
901-902 (2010); see Michael Tabb, The Impact of 2010 Health Care Legislationon False
2
Litigation, GREENE LLP 1, 7 (2011), http://www.greenellp.com/wp-content/uploads/ 011/04/MichaelTabb-PPACA-Amendments.pdf. Others have previously recognized the potential for incentivizing
lawyers and third parties to use the FCA as a tool for patient protection. See, e.g., John M. Parisi, A
Weapon Against Nursing Home Fraudand Abuse, 35 TRIAL 48, 48 (1999) (noting that while most
attorneys engaged in negligent care or other tort-based litigation related to patient abuse are unfamiliar
with the FCA, its use can "ensure that nursing home patients who receive federal benefits also receive

the minimum standard of care required.").
190. Helmer, Jr., supra note 171, at 1262.
191. Justice DepartmentRecovers Over $3.7 Billionfrom False Claims Act Cases in FiscalYear
2017, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.: OFF. OF PUB. AFFS., (Dec. 22, 2017) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr

/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017.
192. Recent amendments to the FCA have given it even greater potential for application in the
context of wage theft. See, e.g., Andrew E. Shipley, Trends in False Claim Act Litigation, in
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS COMPLIANCE 49, 49 (2013) ("Over the past few years, legislative changes

and court decisions affecting the False Claims Act have enlarged the pool of potential plaintiffs,
expanded the legal theories available to them, and weakened potential defenses."). Prior to 2009, the
FCA made liable a person who "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or
employee of the United States ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval." 31 U.S.C.S.

§ 3729(a)(1) (West 2008). The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, however, expanded
liability and the reach of the FCA to subcontractors and indirect recipients of government funds.

United States ex rel. Tran v. Comput. Scis. Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 104, 116-17 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Today, liability attaches when someone "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2012). "False
claims" are those claims submitted pursuant to a contract or other agreement "by means of false
statements or other corrupt or fraudulent conduct, or in violation of any statute or applicable

regulation." Tran, 53 F. Supp. 3d at 117.
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(Davis-Bacon Act 93 and Service Contract Act194) and state (various state
prevailing wage statutes) levels. When a construction contractor or
subcontractor fails to pay its workers prevailing wages pursuant to the
Davis-Bacon Act, a worker has the right to recover those prevailing wages,
as well as file a qui tam lawsuit, for the false claims the contractor made
when it certified, pursuant to the Act, that such prevailing wages were
paid.1 95 If the court determines that such false claims have been made,
significant civil penalties may be imposed on the contractor, from which a
portion may be recovered by the qui tam whistleblower. An application of
qui tam to wage theft cases in some respects embodies more of the English
tradition, which relied heavily on "common informers to secure the
enforcement of laws effecting public order and safety." 196
The False Claims Act currently results in significant returns for relators.
According to the Department of Justice, between 2009 and 2016, the federal
government recovered $31.9 billion under the False Claims Act. 197 In 2016
alone, individuals who brought qui tam or whistleblower actions received
$519 million as a portion of the $4.7 billion recovered.1 98 If this tool were to
be wielded in the wage theft or prevailing wage context, significant gains for
workers could be obtained.1 99 In United States ex rel. Wall v. Circle C
193.

The Davis-Bacon Act's prevailing wage provisions apply to the Related Acts, under which

federal agencies

assist construction projects "through loan[s],

insurance." See 29 C.F.R. § 5.2(c) (2017); see also 40 U.S.C.

grant[s], loan guarantee[s] or

§ 3141

(2012). Contractors and

subcontractors performing on federally funded or assisted contracts in excess of $2,000 for the
construction, alteration, or repair (including painting and decorating) of public buildings or public
works must pay their laborers and mechanics employed under the contract no less than the locally
prevailing wages and fringe benefits for corresponding work on similar projects in the area. 40 U.S.C.
§ 3142(a)-(b) (2012). The Davis-Bacon Act directs the Department of Labor to determine such
locally prevailing wage rates. Id. § 3142(b); see, e.g., United States ex rel. Plumbers & Steamfitters

Loc. Union No. 38 v. C.W. Roen Const. Co., 183 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing a qui
tam action brought by union alleging that construction company failed to pay prevailing wages under

Davis-Bacon Act).
194.

41 U.S.C.

§ 351

(2012). The McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act requires contractors

and subcontractors performing services on prime contracts in excess of $2,500 to pay service
employees in various classes no less than the wage rates and fringe benefits found prevailing in the
locality, or the rates (including prospective increases) contained in a predecessor contractor's
collective bargaining agreement. Id. § 351(a). "The Department of Labor issues wage determinations
on a contract-by-contract basis in response to specific requests from contracting agencies," and
"[t]hese determinations are incorporated into the contract." The McNamara-O'HaraService Contract
Act (SCA), U.S. DEP'T OF LAB.: WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, http://www.dol.gov/whd/govcontracts

/sca.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).
195. 40 U.S.C. §§ 3142(b), 3144 (2012).
196. Helmer, Jr., supra note 171, at 1262 (quoting LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750 143 (1948)).

197.
198.
199.

2018 P.R. Laws 154.
Id.
Id.
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Construction, L.L.C., the Sixth Circuit ruled that the false certification of the
payment of prevailing wages under the DBA or SCA can constitute a false
claim.2 00 In that case, a contractor was found to have certified false payroll
certifications in violation of the DBA.2 01 The employees of a subcontractor
blew the whistle on the contractor, which had represented that it had paid
2 02
Though the
prevailing wages to certain employees but had not done so.
contractor argued that the "primary jurisdiction" of the DBA precluded any
20 3
Finding that the
liability under the FCA, the Sixth Circuit disagreed.
contractor "made false statements, acted in reckless disregard of the truth"
that workers were paid prevailing wages, the court held that the contractor
violated the FCA.204 Knowingly submitting false payroll certification was
not the same, according to the court, as submitting payroll certifications that
contained errors.2 0 s
Some have advocated for a new whistleblower law, one modeled on the
principles of the FCA, but which could be used in all cases of wage theft, not
206
Such a law would allow
just those in which public monies are in the mix.
a worker (or her union or worker center or other advocate) to bring a wage
theft case on behalf of the government. 207 Just as in the case of Title VII, the
government may decide to intercede and take the claim directly, but in any
event a portion of the stolen wages recovered would go to the work (or worker
center or union). According to Gerstein and Seligman, "[t]his type of new
whistleblower law would allow the government to accomplish
comprehensive, workplace-wide remedying of patterns and practices of
violations, either through its own direct enforcement or through
208
whistleblower lawsuits brought on the government's behalf."
B. Applying the FCA to Frontline Wage Theft
To determine whether or not such a qui tam claim might be successful in
cases of frontline worker wage theft, the case of United States v. Science
Applications International Corporation (hereinafter "SAIC") provides
guidance. 209 That case considered whether a government contractor, SAIC,

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See United States ex rel. Wall v. Circle C Const., L.L.C., 697 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 359.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 351-54.
Id. at 357.
Id.

206.

See Gerstein & Seligman, supra note 11.

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See United States v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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was liable under the FCA for certifying, falsely, that it complied with the
conflict-of-interest provisions embedded in its contract with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. 210 This was not a case in which SAIC had not
performed the contracted for services, nor was it a case in which the quality of
the services performed was anything less than expected.2 1 1 Rather, this was a
case in which the plaintiff argued that compliance with the conflict-of-interest
provision was material to the government contract, and therefore any payments
212
Using a
to the company under the contract constituted a "false claim."
"certification theory" of liability, the government was required to establish that
its FCA claim "rests on a false representation of compliance with an applicable
federal statute, federal regulation, or contractual term," in this case the conflictof-interest provision.2 13
SAIC argued that the plaintiff would have to prove that its compliance
with the conflict-of-interest provision was expressly designated by the
government as a condition of payment.214 However, "false certification," may
also be implied, held the district court, effectively lowering the threshold for
liability by requiring only that a plaintiff "prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that compliance with the legal requirement in question is material to
the government's decision to pay."2 15 Under this lower threshold for liability,
SAIC was held liable under the FCA because the plaintiffs were able to
demonstrate that the company's failure to comply with the conflict-of-interest
2 16
provisions was "information critical to the [government's] decision to pay."
Accordingly, a contractor's compliance with wage and other workplace
standards, may indeed be critical to the government's decision to pay that
contractor. This may be the case for multiple reasons already discussed, such
as the potential loss of tax revenues owed to the government as the result of
wage theft; the obligation of government entities to protect the employees
themselves; as well as increasingly universal concerns related to pay equity for

210. Id. at 1263.
211. United States v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 958 F. Supp. 2d 53, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
("There is evidence in the record that SAIC provided 'extremely high' quality work to the NRC and
that the NRC continued to use SAIC's work even after it discovered the alleged OCIs.").
212. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d at 1266.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1261, 1268; Kennedy, supra note 37, at 546 ("This was the standard the Second
Circuit previously established in Mikes v. Straus. Under the Mikes standard, the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) would have to expressly designate compliance with the FLSA or other
applicable wage and hour laws as a condition of reimbursement for a plaintiff to successfully argue that

wage theft is a violation of the FCA.").
215. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d at 1271 (emphasis added).
216. See United States v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 2d 40,49-51 (D. Colo. 2008)
(quoting United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 421, 426-27 (2002)).
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BIPOC and female employees.2 7 Failure to comply with such standards, using
an implied certification theory, triggers liability with each submitted invoice for
services performed. 2 18
Provided an express or implied certification theory is applied in a case
of wage theft, a second issue is the calculation of damages. 219 When a worker
is not paid prevailing wages, but provides the contracted for services, what is
the loss to the federal government?22 0 Traditional contract remedies seek to
put the plaintiff in the position it would have been, had it not been for the
defendant's false claim, and likewise courts in FCA cases apply either a
"benefit of the bargain" or an "out of pocket cost" framework. 22 1 In the SAIC
case, where the quality of the services provided to the government were
irrefutably high, the government argued nonetheless that had it known SAIC
was not in compliance with the conflict-of-interest provisions, it would not
have paid SAIC any amount for those services rendered.2 22 Indeed, the jury
would ultimately be instructed to disregard the value of the services provided,
and instead calculate as damages the amount paid to SAIC above what it
would have paid had it known about the conflicts of interest.22 3
There is an argument that such a remedy-where the government has
received the services for which it bargained, at the level at which it
expected-is unfair, because the government suffered no real damages. That
argument fails to include in its calculation the moral hazard created when an
underpaying employer (or, in the case of the Anti-Kickback Statute, an
overcharging physician) is allowed to escape penalty simply because its
workers provided high quality services.224 For that reason, courts have

217. Kennedy, supra note 37, at 547-48.
218. Id. at 548.
219. E.g., Sci. ApplicationsInt 'l Corp., 626 F.3d at 1257, 1277-78 (illustrating that after applying
an expressed or implied certification theory, the court then shifts to calculate damages).
220. See id. at 1278.
221. See Kennedy, supra note 37, at 549 ("In a case where the court applies the benefit-of-thebargain standard, damages will equal the difference between the market value of the contracted-for goods
or services and the market value of those goods or services as actually received. There are cases, however,
in which it is difficult to ascertain the market value of the goods or services, in which case the court will
assess damages as the difference between the price the government paid (its 'out of pocket costs') and the
actual value to the government of what it received.").
222. Sci. ApplicationsInt'l Corp., 626 F.3d at 1265.
223. Id. at 1278 ("[T]he damages that the United States is entitled to recover under the False
Claims Act are the amount of money that the government paid out by reason of the false claims over
and above what it would have paid out had SAIC not made the false claims.... Your calculations of
damages should be limited to determining what the Nuclear Regulatory Commission paid to [SAIC]
over and above what the NRC would have paid had it known of SAIC's organizational conflicts of
interest. Your calculation of damages should not attempt to account for the value of services, if any,
that SAIC conferred upon the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.") (internal citations omitted).
224. Kennedy, supra note 37, at 549-50.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol38/iss2/2

36

Kennedy: Deputizing the Frontline: Enforcing Workplace Rights in a Post-Pa
20211]

DEPUTIZING THE FRONTLINE

239

awarded all amounts paid by the government in those cases to be recoverable
as damages.225 This was not the case in SAIC, where the court declined to
award the government the total amount it had paid to the contractor as
damages, unless the government could show "that the services it received
were truly worthless."2 2 6 This case appears to have shifted the court's inquiry
in FCA cases away from a theory of unjust enrichment, and bring them more
into line with a traditional analysis of financial injury. 227
In the context of frontline work, "there are several stakeholders who
might serve as relators." 228 Workers themselves would be best positioned to
report any underpayment of wages or misclassification of employment
status. 22 9 "Incentivizing private persons (i.e., workers, consumers, and family
members) to blow the whistle on wage theft using qui tam litigation could
help mitigate the limitations on public enforcement" placed on local and state
government in a post-pandemic recovery.23 0 Given the low wages endemic
to many workers engaged in the kind of work governed by the Davis-Bacon
and Service Contract Acts, however, any recovery that is based solely on a
percentage of a worker's owed wages may not be an adequate financial reward.
A focus on equity must guide this process, not only with respect to the
individual worker - whose wages, if substandard, constitute a form of unjust
enrichment by an employer in receipt of public funds - but also to local
economies, the health of which depends on a robust and creative system of
wage theft enforcement.231
Incentivizing or encouraging underpaid or misclassified workers to bring a
qui tam action under the FCA (or, as Professor Pandya suggests,
reporting such cases of wage theft to the taxing authority as a tax
informant) could serve as a new approach to combatting the problem of
wage theft.

225. Id. at 550.
226. Kennedy, supra note 37, at 550; see also United States v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 626
F.3d at 1257, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
227. Kennedy, supranote 37, at 548-550.
228. Id. at 550; see also Helmer, Jr., supra note 171, at 1262.
229. See Helmer, Jr., supra note 171, at 1262. The most widely followed misclassification case
involves drivers for app-based ride services such as Uber and Lyft, and food delivery services such
as Uber Eats, Postmates, and DoorDash. See Josh Eidelson, Uber, Lyft Called Out in Hometown for

Flouting Workplace Law, BLOOMBERG NEWS WIRE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca
/uber-lyft-called-out-in-hometown-for-flouting-workplace-law-1.1411830. While drivers have been
largely sidelined during the COVID-19 pandemic, food delivery workers have seen an explosion in
hours, as well as their continued classification as independent contractors, in some cases in blatant
violation of state law. Id.
230. Kennedy, supra note 37, at 551.

231. Id. at 551-52.
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If, however, qui tam litigation in the context of wage theft is foreclosed
by federal courts' interpretations of implied certification requirements
or by the calculation of damages, equitable arguments remain. That the
receipt of [public] dollars should impose additional responsibilities,
including fiduciary duties, on [employers] is an argument rooted in
principles of unjust enrichment and the collateral impacts of wage theft
on local economies.2

Another possible avenue would be use of debarment for government
contractors who commit wage theft.23 3 Such a barring of eligibility for federal
contracts could help incentivize employers to ensure they are complying
with standards, and as a matter of policy, taxpayer dollars should not
support companies that break the law. 234
In contemplating the rollout of federal, state and local projects that
could help spur economic recovery in a post-pandemic nation, we would
be well-served to learn from the past. Under such New Deal programs
created in the 1930s and 1940s, including the Works Progress
Administration and Civilian Conservation Corps, such public spending
created "numerous opportunities for unscrupulous government
contractors to defraud the government." 2 3 s "A corresponding influx in the
number of qui tam suits occurred under the FCA, which until then had
been mostly untapped by relators." 236 In economically desperate times,
however, not only was combating fraud more necessary, many of the
relators themselves were regarded as "opportunistic private litigants,"
chasing after "generous cash bounties" by bringing "parasitic lawsuits
copied from preexisting indictments or based upon congressional
investigations." 23 7 Any system to combat wage theft using the tool of qui
tam should structure the procedural requirements to tamp down on
inefficiencies and opportunism, while still maintaining the strong
2 38
financial incentives for relators to blow the whistle on wage theft.

232.

Id.

233.

See Helmer, Jr., supranote 171, at 1262.

234. Id.
235. Hughes IV, supra note 172, at 66 (quoting United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron
Employees.' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
236. Id. (citing Untied States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649
(D.C. Cir. 1994)).
237. Id. at 67 (citing Findley, 105 F.3d at 679-80).
238. See Sachin S. Pandya, Tax Liabilityfor Wage Theft, 3 Colum. J. Tax L. 113, 131-32 (2012).
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C. State Qui Tam Innovation
1.

New York False Claims Act

In New York, concerns about rampant and unchecked Medicaid
fraud prompted the state legislature to pass the New York False Claims
Act in 2007.239 At the time, New York spent nearly $45 billion annually
through the Medicaid program, more than any other state in the nation,
and the program was found to be "riddled with waste and corruption,"
with critics estimating that "fraud accounts for as much as 10 percent of
the state's Medicaid expenditures each year." 24 0 The New York FCA
largely mirrored the federal False Claims Act, in that it subjects any
"person" who "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval" by the state or a "false record
or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim" paid or approved by
the state to civil liability, including treble damages.2 41 As with the federal
act, individual whistleblowers are empowered to bring qui tam actions on
behalf of the state to recover any amounts paid due to fraud.24 2 As
rationale for the bill, it's sponsors explained that the "state is involved in
the direct and indirect payment of tens of billions of dollars every year,
and the payment of fraudulent claims has a significant adverse effect on
the fiscal well-being of the state." 2 43
Thirty-one states have a version of the federal False Claims Act,
which are typically used in cases where state and local contractors
overcharge the government or commit some other type of fraud.244 For
decades the False Claims Act and its "qui tam" whistleblower provision
has been used to fight contractors who overcharge the government and
engage in other types of fraud. 24 5 But a recent settlement under the New
York False Claims Act shows that the law can be used to protect workers'
rights. 24 6 In 2017, the Laborers International Union used the New York
239.
23, 2007,
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See Carl Loewenson & Ruti Smithline, New York's New False Claims Act, N.Y.L.J. (Apr.
12:00 AM), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/nylj070423.pdf.
Id.
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(1) (McKinney 2018).
See id. § 190(2).
See S. 2064, 230th Ann. Legis. Sess. at 1.
See State False Claims Act, PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI, LLP,

https://www.falseclaimsact.com/states-municipalities-fcas (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
245. See Helmer, Jr., supra note 171, at 1267.
246. Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att'y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces $255,000
Settlement with General Contractorand Developerfor Failureto Pay Workers Required Prevailing

Wage (Feb. 9, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2017/ag-schneiderman-announces-255000settlement-general-contractor-and-developer.
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False Claims Act to settle allegations that a construction contractor and
developer falsely certified that they were paying their workers the
prevailing wage rate. 24 7 In that case, a New York City-based general
contractor, A. Aleem Construction Inc., (hereinafter "Aleem"), and a
developer, West 13 1St Street Development Corp. (hereinafter "West
131"), participated in the Neighborhood Entrepreneurs Program of the
New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development
(hereinafter "DPD"). 248 Through that program, which was partially
funded with federal money, private developers renovated and resold
deteriorated city-owned buildings. Completed buildings would then be
sold to the Neighborhood Partnership Housing Development Fund
Corporation and leased to program participants. 2 49
Since the project was funded in part with federal monies, including
a low-interest thirteen million dollar loan and certain property tax breaks,
federal prevailing wage laws applied. 250 The building where the wage
theft took place, 241 W. 13 5 th Street, in Manhattan, included ten
affordable housing units, half of which were designated "for families of
four making less than $54,000."251 Aleem and West 131 certified that all
workers on the project were paid prevailing wages. 2 2 Workers on the
project made claims that contradicted that certification, and the Laborers
Eastern Region Organizing Fund of the Laborers International Union of
North America (hereinafter "LIUNA") helped organize the workers to
bring forth their claim and served as the relator.25 3 According to New
York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, carpenters working on the
project should have been paid forty dollars per hour, plus another thirty
dollars in benefits.2 5 4 One of Aleem's subcontractors-SJ Insulationpaid only twelve to fourteen dollars per hour, according to
Schneiderman. 2

247. Id.
248. Jonathan Sizemore, PrevailingWage Violation Leads to $255,000 Settlement with Attorney
General, CITYLAND (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.citylandnyc.org/prevailing-wage-settlement; see
also Greg. B. Smith, Exclusive: Construction Firm Reaches $189G Settlement After Charged with

Ripping Off Workers in HarlemHousingProject,N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 9, 2017, 12:00AM), https://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/construction-firm-reaches-189g-settlement-wage-cheat-case-

article-1.2967879.
249. Sizemore, supranote 248.
250. Id.; Smith, supranote 248.
251. Smith, supra note 248.
252. Id.
253. See Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att'y Gen., supranote 246.
254. Smith, supra note 248.
255. Id.
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The New York law also adopts the federal requirement that to be a
qui tam whistleblower, the relator must be "an 'original source' of the
allegations in the complaint." 256 , "That is, the whistleblower must have
direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the
allegations are based and must have voluntarily provided it to the
government." 257
In essence, the qui tam provision provides monetary incentives for
whistleblowers who have special knowledge of the fraud and the
documentation to back up the charges to come forward and assist the
government in recovering monies it has paid out as a result of fraud....
[Qui tam] provides powerful financial incentives to private persons who
may know about fraud on the state. 258

This unique knowledge is what powers the co-regulatory framework
described above; frontline workers themselves are, in some respects, best
positioned to blow the whistle on systemic underpayment of wages and
benefits. 25 9 Creative and expansive application of qui tam laws can help
workers and their advocates navigate around the structural barriers of
underfunded enforcement agencies, mandatory arbitration agreements,
and class action restrictions.260
2.

The Empire Worker Protection Act

Another example of bottom-up co-enforcement is embodied in
legislation introduced to the New York Assembly, the "Empowering
People in Rights Enforcement Worker Protection Act" (hereinafter
"EmPIRE Worker Act"), which would extend the power of the state
attorney general to private citizens in order to enforce New York
workplace rights. 261 The bill would allow a victim of wage theft, a
256. Loewenson & Smithline, supra note 239.
257. Id.; see Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 463 (2007) ("An 'original
source' is 'an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the
allegations are based.and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an
action under this section which is based on the information."') (quoting False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(e)(4)(B)).
258. Loewenson & Smithline, supra note 239.
259. See Alexander & Prasad, supra note 63, at 1073, 1077, 1084-85, 1094.
260. See Gerstein & Seligman, supra note 11.
261. Assemb. 7958, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sesh. (N.Y. 2017); 2017 Bill Tracking NY A.B. 7958
(LEXIS); see also S. 6553, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); 2017 Bill Tracking NY S.B.
6553 (LEXIS) (allowing us to compare the differences between the EMPIRE Worker Protection Act
and EMPIRE Consumer Act, which is namely that the EMPIRE Worker Protection Act authorizes an
aggrieved employee or representative organization to initiate a public enforcement action on behalf
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whistleblower, or an organization (e.g., union, worker center) to bring a
qui tam enforcement action on behalf of the state for violations of any
provision of New York labor law. 262 If an EmPIRE action were
successful, the New York State Department of Labor would receive most
of the civil penalties recovered in the action, with the rest distributed to
the aggrieved worker. 2 63 Moreover, if an organization designated by an
employee (such as a labor union or worker center), brings the complaint,
and any civil penalties are recovered, such monies will be distributed as
follows: thirty percent to the aggrieved employee or employees; fifteen
percent to the representative organization, fifty-five percent to the
commissioner for enforcement of the law and education of employers and
employees about their rights under the law. 2 64
The framework for the EmPIRE Worker Act, which was
reintroduced in 2019 but failed to pass, is a complaint-driven model,
designed to empower workers and their advocates, without regard for the
operational capacity required for an agency-driven model. 265 Given the
sharp decline in numbers of senior labor investigators employed by the
state and federal departments of labor, the law sought to "deputize the
frontline," providing financial incentives for workers themselves to file
claims. 266 EmPIRE was modeled on California's 2004 Private Attorney's
General Act (hereinafter "PAGA"), which significantly expanded that
state's enforcement capacity by empowering individual citizens and
worker organizations to investigate and initiate enforcement actions. 267
of the Labor Commissioner for violations of any provision of the New York labor law, while the
EMPIRE Consumer Act allows aggrieved consumers to initiate similar public actions on behalf of
the Attorney General to enforce specified consumer-protection statutes).

262. See Assemb. 7958; see also S.B. 6553.
263. See Assemb. 7958; see also S.B. 6553 (discussing when a lawsuit is brought under
EmPIRE, sixty to seventy percent of the penalties recovered depending on whether the state
intervenes in the action are returned to the state, generating desperately needed revenue to expand
capacity of the DOL).

264. See S.B. 6553.
265. See Assemb. 7958; see also S.B. 6553.
266. See S.B. 6553.
267. The Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3. An
administrative process established under PAGA first requires that workers file a claim with the Labor
and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and pay a filing fee. Id. § 2699.3(a)(1)(A)-(B). The
LWDA then has 65 days to either agree to investigate and prosecute the alleged violation, or to give
notice of their intent not to investigate or cite the employer, which authorizes the worker to file a civil

action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated workers. Id.

§ 2699.3(a)(2)(A)-(B).

If the

LWDA decides to investigate or cite the employer, that have up to 180 days to conduct that process

and come to a decision. Id. § 2699.3(a)(2)(B). For certain violations, the employer has a 33-day
window in which to cure the violation and avoid a penalty. Id. § 2699.3(c)(2)(A). No employer may
avail themselves to the notice and cure provisions of PAGA more than three instances in any 12-

month period, or once per year for certain paystub reporting violations. Id. § 2699.3(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
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California's Private Attorney General Act

The idea of state and local governments taking up the slack in
response to federal retrenchment on labor law investigation and
enforcement is not new. 268 California led this movement with the passage,
in 2004, of the Private Attorney General Act, which empowers workers
and their advocates to report labor law abuses and recoup a portion of
penalties awarded. 2 69 PAGA was passed in response to critical deficits in
the state's ability to effectively investigate and prosecute such violations
on behalf of a growing workforce.2 7 0 Though a longtime leader in
expanding workers' rights through increased minimum wage standards,
anti-retaliation laws, and paid sick leave, prior to PAGA, California
lacked sufficient resources to enforce these rights and standards on their
own. 27 1 For example, although its workforce nearly doubled between
1980 and 2000, the ratio of enforcement staff to workers declined by
thirty-six percent.272 PAGA addressed this issue (as well as lack of will
among district attorneys to divert resources away from violent crime
investigation and prosecution) by allowing "aggrieved employees, acting
as private attorneys general, to recover civil penalties for Labor Code
violations, with the understanding that labor law enforcement agencies
were to retain primacy over private enforcement efforts." 273

Other states are considering crafting similar enforcement tools through their legislatures. See, e.g.,

S.B. 6553; H.B. 1965, 66th Leg., Reg. Sesh., (Wash. 2019); H.B. 438, 2019 Leg., Leg. Sesh. (Vt.
2019); S.B. 1066, 191st Gen. Court (Me. 2019-2020); S.B. 750, 80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sesh. (Or.
2019).
268. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2698 (2004).
269. Id. § 2699.
270. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 379, 327 P.3d 129, 146 (2014)
("[T]he Assembly Committee on Labor and Employment indicated that the Department of Industrial
Relations (DIR), 'was failing to effectively enforce labor law violations. Estimates of the size of
California's 'underground economy'-businesses operating outside the state's tax and licensing
requirements-ranged from 60 to 140 billion dollars a year, representing a tax loss to the state of three
to six billion dollars annually. Further, a U.S. Department of Labor study of the garment industry in
Los Angeles, which employs over 100,000 workers, estimated the existence of over 33,000 serious
and ongoing wage violations by the city's garment industry employers, but that DIR was issuing fewer
than 100 wage citations per year for all industries throughout the state. [¶] Moreover, evidence
demonstrates that the resources dedicated to labor law enforcement have not kept pace with the growth
of the economy in California."') (internal citations omitted).

271.

Rachel Deutsch et al., California'sHero Labor Law: The PrivateAttorneys GeneralAct

Fights Wage Theft and Recovers Millionsfrom Lawbreaking Corporations,UCLA LAB. CTR., CTR.
FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY & P'SHIP FOR WORKING FAMS. 3-4 (Feb. 2020), https://escholarship.org

/uc/item/98f8556s.
272. Id. at 4.
273. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 379.
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Financial penalties recovered as a result of actions pursued by such
frontline deputies not only benefited the individual worker, but also
helped to more fully fund the state's traditional enforcement arms. 274
Penalties recovered by employees suing an employer as a proxy or agent
of California's state labor law enforcement agencies are distributed as
follows: seventy-five percent to the California Labor and Workforce
Development Agency (hereinafter "LWDA"), and twenty-five percent
among the employees affected by the violations. 27 The three-quarters
recovery for the LWDA provides a critical source of funding for the
agency to conduct independent investigations, as well as to support the
creation of public education campaigns that encourage workers to bring
claims forward. 276 For example, a PAGA lawsuit against Bank of
America for requiring that its employees stand for the duration of their
shift, resulted in a settlement that allocated $10 million to the LWDA. 277
The agency used those proceeds to hire nine additional staff persons,
greatly augmenting its enforcement capacity. 278 Although most wage and
hour class actions are subject to a four-year statute of limitations, plaintiffs
bringing a PAGA action have only one year to file their claim. 2 79
A PAGA representative action is therefore a type of qui tam action. 280
"Traditionally, the requirements for enforcement by a citizen in a qui tam
action have been (1) that the statute exacts a penalty; (2) that part of the
penalty be paid to the informer; and (3) that, in some way, the informer
be authorized to bring suit to recover the penalty." 281 The PAGA
274.

See Coming Up Short: The State of Wage Theft Enforcement in New York, supra note 57,

at 22 ("Prior to PAGA, much of California's labor code went unenforced, affecting workers in all
industries, but especially those in the underground economy, including undocumented workers in
industries such as hospitality, landscaping, construction, and agriculture."). "In 2017-2018, PAGA
brought in $34.6 million in revenue." Id. It is estimated that if New York were to pass the EmPIRE
Act, it would raise $17.7 million in annual revenue for the DOL. Id.

275. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(i) (West 2016).
276. Id. § 2699(j).
277. Deutsch et al., supranote 271, at 7-8; see Garrett v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 13-CV-05263JST, 2014 WL 1648759 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2014) ("Plaintiff Nicole Garrett ('Garrett'), a former
bank teller employed by BANA, filed suit against Defendant Bank of America ('BANA') in Alameda
Superior Court alleging that BANA has violated California's labor law provisions that require
employers to provide seats for their workers.").
278. Deutsch et al., supra note 271, at 8 (internal citation omitted).

279. CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE § 340(a) (West 2003).
280. Sanders v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 661, 670 (Ct. App. 1975) ("Black defines
qui tam actions as: 'An action brought by an informer, under a statute which establishes a penalty for
the commission or omission of a certain act, and provides that the same shall be recoverable in a civil
action, part of the penalty to go to any person who will bring such action and the remainder to the
state or some other institution is called a 'qui tam action'; because the plaintiff states that he sues as
well for the state as for himself."') (citing qui tam actions, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)).

281.

Id. at 671.
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conforms to these traditional criteria, except that a portion of the penalty
goes not only to the citizen bringing the suit but to all employees affected
by the Labor Code violation. 2 82 "The government entity on whose behalf
the plaintiff files suit is always the real party in interest in the suit." 2 83
Notably, while courts have been willing to uphold arbitration
agreements that contain class action waivers, the California Supreme
Court has held that PAGA actions cannot be waived by employees and
cannot be compelled to arbitration.2 84 In Iskanian v. CLS Transportation
Los Angeles, LLC, the Court held that, "an arbitration agreement requiring
an employee as a condition of employment to give up the right to bring
representative PAGA actions in any forum is contrary to public policy." 285
The California model has taken root elsewhere. 2 86 In 2011, New York
passed the Wage Theft Prevention Act to increase the civil damages for
wage and hour law violations and related retaliation that plaintiffs could
receive under state law. 287 At the local level, several Florida counties and
one municipality have also expanded the capacity for private enforcement
of wage theft through pro se claims. 288
One example of how PAGA has resulted in successful labor law
compliance in notoriously abusive workplaces, the California Rural Legal
Assistance Foundation assisted four landscape workers in Stockton,
California in pursuing their claim. 2 89 The lawsuit, filed on behalf of their
fifty-eight co-workers, alleged serious violations of wage theft, being
forced to work in extreme heat, and a lack of required rest breaks. 290 Up
to $8,200 for each worker was recovered, which "[i]n an industry
notorious for abusing vulnerable workers, [is a] type of relief [that] would
be unimaginable without the ability to bring actions collectively to recover
significant statutory and civil penalties." 291 In 2019, California collected

282. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a), (g) (West 2016).
283. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 382, 327 P.3d 129, 148 (2014);
see also In re Marriage of Biddle, 52 Cal. App. 4th 396, 399, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569, 571 (1997).
284. See Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 383-84.
285. Id. at 360.
286. See Betancourt v. Prudential Overall Supply, 9 Cal. App. 5th 439, 445, 215 Cal. Rptr. 3d
344, 348 (2017) ("The PAGA was designed to address two problems. The first problem was that
alleged Labor Code violations often went unenforced because they were punishable as criminal
misdemeanors, and prosecutors rarely investigated or prosecuted the alleged violations. The second
problem was that when civil penalties could be assessed, there were few government resources to
pursue enforcement of the penalties.").

287. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198 (McKinney 2016); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215 (McKinney 2019).
288.
289.

Elmore, supranote 66 at 95.
Deutsch et al., supranote 271, at 5.

290.
291.

Id.
Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

45

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

248

[Vol. 38:2

more than $88 million in penalties from employers pursuant to claims
brought by workers under the Private Attorneys General Act. 292
According to a recent study, those penalties reflected "serious wrongdoing
by massive employers," including systemic violations by large, low-wage
employers. 293 The most significant PAGA judgments and settlements
address systemic violations by large low-wage employers, including Bank
of America, Walmart, Rite Aid, Target, Virgin America, and CVS. 294
4.

Washington State HB1965

The state of Washington, like California, is a state that has
historically created workplace standards and rights that exceed federal
minimums, and-in industries such as the on-demand economy,
agriculture, and domestic workers-has provided national leadership on
protecting workers in the absence of traditional legal protections. 2 95
Substantive rights are meaningless, however, in the absence of effective
enforcement, which for some enforcement agencies can mean "years-long
backlogs." 296 In response to this critical lack of enforcement resources,
and in light of the success of California's PAGA, state Representative
Drew Hansen introduced HB 1965 into the Washington State House of
Representatives.297 HB1965 would allow whistleblowers to bring actions
on behalf of the state for violations of a variety of state workplace
protections. 298 Through a qui tam action, similar to those permitted under
the states' Medicaid False Claims Act, an individual worker or workers'
association could enforce laws related to minimum wage, prevailing
wages, overtime, health and safety standards, paid sick and family leave,
equal pay, discrimination, rest breaks and laws related to agricultural and
292.

Heather Appel, New Report: Calfornia'sHero LaborLaw - the PrivateAttorneys General

Act - Recovered $88 Million for the State from Lawbreaking Corporations in 2019, P'SHIP FOR
WORKING FAMS.: BLOG & NEWS (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/blog/newreport-california%E2%80%99s-hero-labor-law-%E2%80%93-private-attorneys-general-act-

%E2%80%93-recovered-88-million.
293. Id.
294. Garrett v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 13-CV-05263-JST, 2014 WL 1648759 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
24, 2014); Magadia v. Wal-Mart Assocs. Inc., 384 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Hall v. Rite
Aid Corp., 226 Cal. App. 4th 278, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 504 (2014); Thompson v. Target Corp., No.
EDCV1600839JGBMRWX, 2016 WL 4119937 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2,2016); Bernstein v. Virgin Am.,
Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 980 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 63 Cal. 4th 1, 368 P.3d
554 (2016).
295. See, e.g., Kennedy, supranote 118, at 1019, 1036.
296. David Groves, Empowering Workers to Blow the Whistle, THE STAND (Feb. 13, 2020),
https://www.thestand.org/2020/02/empowering-workers-to-blow-the-whistle/.
297. Id.

298.

Id.
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seasonal labor. 299 If an alleged violation does not provide a civil penalty,
a civil penalty of $500 is established and "must be awarded for each
aggrieved employee for each two-week time period." 300
Any penalty amounts awarded in a successful qui tam action under
HB1965 would be distributed as follows: (1) if the agency intervenes in
the action, "20 percent to the relator and 80 percent to the agency; and (2)
if the agency does not intervene, 40 percent to the relator and 60 percent
to the agency." 301 Damages, however, must be awarded to the agency for
distribution to aggrieved employees, and the relator is entitled to
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 3 02 Though the bill failed to reach a
vote prior to sine die, advocates for the bill hope to continue gaining
momentum; in contemplating future state budgets operating with even
less money for workplace enforcement as a result of COVID-19, measures
like HB 1965 may find greater bipartisan political support. 303
5.

Preemption Concerns

Any attempt by state and local governments to either raise workplace
standards or extend labor and employment rights to workers traditionally
excluded from federal protections triggers the threat of a legal challenge
on preemption grounds. 30 4 In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that arbitration agreements governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act (hereinafter "FAA") may lawfully prohibit collective and
class actions in employment disputes.305 In that case, the Court upheld as
valid arbitration agreements pursuant to which employees had agreed (or
in some cases, assented to simply by remaining in their jobs) to waive
their rights to "group arbitration," arguably in contravention of their rights
under the National Labor Relations Act to "engage in concerted activities

299. WASH. STATE H.R., LAB. & WORKPLACE STANDARDS COMM., BILL ANALYSIS OF H.B.
1965, at 2-3 (2019) ("No qui tam action may be brought if the agency issued an order or otherwise
resolved the complaint.").
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id at 3.
Id at 4.
Id.
See generally States Grappling with Hit to Tax Collections, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y
PRIORITIES (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-2-20sfp.pdf
(reporting the effect that COVID-19 has had on state budgets due to sharp drops in revenue, which
may lead to changes in views on previously proposed legislation).
304. See generally The General Issue: Preemption, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., https://
www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-8/clause-3/the-general-issue-preemption

(last visited Feb. 15, 2021) (discussing the preemption challenges the Supreme Court faces when
handling conflicts between federal and state labor laws).
305. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1612 (2018).
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for... mutual aid or protection." 306 As we know, the amount in
controversy when dealing with low-wage, frontline worker wage theft, is
often too low to make pursuing an individual claim worthwhile, especially
307
In the
when weighed against the costs and collateral consequences.
the
eliminate
simply
employers
wake of Epic Systems, however, might
possibility of workers bringing a qui tam action by including a waiver of
308
such right in their arbitration agreement?
Even though employers enforce class waivers in arbitration clauses,
using qui tam to blow the whistle on wage theft would not involve private
litigants suing on their own behalf, but rather, a state's action to enforce
its worker protection laws. 309 California's PAGA has been upheld in
310
As the Ninth Circuit held in
federal and state courts on that very basis.
Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc., qui tam actions fall under
the "historic police powers" delegated to the states by the U.S.
311
Simply
Constitution and therefore cannot be preempted by federal law.
to, in
state
the
of
rights
the
away
contract
cannot
put, private individuals
these cases, seek penalties for employers who violate minimum and
prevailing wage standards. 12 Critical to this analysis is the fact that the
individual worker (or worker center or labor union) is not seeking
compensatory damages; rather, the qui tam action is seeking statutory perincident penalties on behalf of in-state consumers or employees. 313 This
is regarded as a model of damages that are complementary-rather than
4
duplicative of individual damages actions or arbitration."
One critique of this model, however, is that which is levied against
qui tam actions more generally, which is whether this system primarily
benefits the plaintiffs qui tam bar, rather than individual frontline
workers. 315 For example, what happens when state government intervenes
306. Id. at 1614, 1635-36.
307.

See supra Part I.B.

308. See generally Alison Miller, Epic Systems: Employers can Collectively Celebrate the
Supreme Court's Decision Validating Class Action Waivers, WILLIS TOWERS WATSON (Oct. 9,
2018), https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/2018/10/finex-observer-epic-systemsand-class-action-waivers (discussing the implications of the Epic Systems decision for employers and
various considerations before drafting mandatory arbitration agreement waivers for employees to
sign, as employers now have the power to block such actions).

309. Gerstein & Seligman, supra note 11.
310. Id.
311. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 439 (9th Cir. 2015).
312. Id.
313. See id. at 430-31 (observing that "the penalties contemplated under the PAGA ...

punish

and deter employer practices that violate the rights of numerous employees").

314. Id. at 436-37.
315. See Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin a Cat: Qui Tam Actions as a State Legislative
Response to Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203, 1203 (2013).
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and overrules the action? 16 Are workers in those cases in a weaker
position to ultimately recover lost wages than they would have been filing
an individual claim?31 7 As one such critic explained, "the qui tam model
does not put funds into the pockets of injured victims. The penalties flow
to the state and, to a lesser extent, the relator. Accordingly, the qui tam
model may do a good job of promoting deterrence but an awful job of
compensating injured parties."3 18 With this criticism in mind, state and
local approaches need to build in additional safeguards for frontline
workers that ensure a more just and equitable recovery.31 9 Cognizant of
the ways in which certain groups of workers are routinely made more
vulnerable within the civil justice system, PAGA includes certain
protections, such as the requirement that the LDWA approve any
settlement only after having an opportunity to review and comment upon
any proposed settlements."
CONCLUSION

The coronavirus may be novel, but we have been here before.
American workplace history has been marked by persistent and unchecked
wage theft that is exacerbated by employers' incentives to violate workplace
standards and employees' disincentives to pursue claims." Though some of
the most groundbreaking advances in workers' rights have occurred through
federal action, from collective bargaining, to affirmative action, to civil rights,
often the federal government erects additional barriers to enforcing or
expanding those rights. Raising standards through an expanded application
of prevailing wage laws, and deputizing workers to enforce those higher
standards through a more robust and expansive qui tam model, would be an
"elegant and effective way[] to expand the government's resources and serve
important public goals, creating additional resources for enforcement at
minimal cost to taxpayers."32 2 The victims of wage theft are not limited to
316.

See id.

317.
318.
319.

See supra Section III.C.
Gilles, supranote 185, at 2237.
See supraSection I.C.

320. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a), (e)(1) (West 2016). Epic Systems has no apparent effect on the
California Supreme Court's 2014 ruling in Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th
348, 327 P.3d 129 (2014) that the FAA has no preemptive effect on PAGA because the FAA's purpose
is specific to the resolution ofprivate disputes, and a PAGA claim is by nature a dispute between an
employer and the state. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); see also Iskanian v.

CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 327 P.3d 129 (2014). SCOTUS declined to review
Iskanian.

321. See supraSection I.A
322.

Gerstein & Seligman, supra note 11.
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individual frontline workers; unchecked wage theft siphons off taxpayer
323
dollars and public trust, further straining a community's social safety net.
This article's proposals for collaborative enforcement through prevailing
wage and qui tam claims would augment existing "bottom up" strategies in
order to create an economy "more resilient to challenges such as COVID19 and ... its aftermath." 32 4

323.

See supra Section I.B.

324.

Madland et al., supra note 10.
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